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ABSTRACT 
Kenyan horticultural exports are often cited as a success story in African agriculture.  
Fruit and vegetable exports from C￿te d’Ivoire have received less attention, but the export 
value is similar to that of Kenya.  This paper focuses on three questions.  First, do the 
horticultural sectors of Kenya and C￿te d’Ivoire constitute valid success stories?  Second, 
what factors have contributed to the success (or lack thereof)?  And third, to what degree can 
the success be replicated in other African countries?   
The paper finds that Kenyan horticultural exports are indeed a success story: 
horticulture has become the third largest earner of foreign exchange, more than half the 
exports are produced by smallholders, and smallholders gain from producing for the export 
market.  At the same time, the total number of smallholders producing for export is relatively 
small, and trends in European retailing may shift the advantage to larger producers.  C￿te 
d’Ivoire is not as clearly a success story because the most of the exports are produced on 
large industrial estates and because growth has been uneven.  Ivorian exports rely on 
preferential access to European markets relative to Latin American exporters, raising doubts 
about sustainability.    
Factors in the growth and success of horticultural exports include a realistic exchange 
rate, stable policies, a good investment climate, competitive international transport 
connections, institutional, and social links with markets in Europe, and continual 
experimentation with the market institutions to link farmers and exporters.  Smallholder 
participation is encouraged by farmer training and extension schemes, investment in small-
scale irrigation, and assistance in establishing links with exporters.   
Many of the lessons of Kenyan horticulture can be applied elsewhere in Africa.  
Indeed, Kenya faces increasing competition from neighboring countries trying to replicate its 
success.  At the same time, market institutions take time to develop, and demand constraints 
probably prevent other African countries from achieving the same level of success as Kenya. 
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ARE HORTICULTURAL EXPORTS A REPLICABLE SUCCESS STORY? 
EVIDENCE FROM KENYA AND C￿TE D’IVOIRE 
 
Nicholas Minot




1.  INTRODUCTION 
In a recent survey in which experts were asked to identify successes in African 
agriculture, horticultural exports were the third most common commodity-specific citation. 
About half of the respondents who listed horticulture mentioned Kenya by name (Gabre-
Madhin and Haggblade 2001).  It is not difficult to see why Kenyan horticulture is 
considered a success story.  First, the sector has grown significantly over the past several 
decades (Figure 1).  The fruit and vegetable exports from Kenya have increased four-fold in 
constant dollar terms since 1974, reaching US$ 167 million in 2000.  In fact, horticulture has 
become the third largest source of foreign exchange after tourism and tea
3.   Second, small 
farmers have participated significantly in the growth of the sector.  It is estimated that about 
half of Kenyan horticultural exports are produced by smallholders.  Although less well-
documented, fruit and vegetable exports in C￿te d’Ivoire have also expanded rapidly, rising 
4.4 percent annually over the 1990s to match the value of Kenyan fruit and vegetable 
exports.  Smallholders have also played an important role in exports from C￿te d’Ivoire.  
After South Africa, Kenya and C￿te d’Ivoire are the largest fruit and vegetable exporters in 
sub-Saharan African. 
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3   Coffee and tea have been the main export commodities of Kenya for decades.  However, as a result of recent 




















































































































Real value of exports
 
Source: FAOStat for agricultural statistics and U.S. Department of Commerce for U.S. consumer price index. 
 
This paper uses the cases of Kenya and C￿te d’Ivoire to examine the question of 
whether horticultural exports represent a replicable success story.  This question can be 
divided into three parts: 
•  Do the horticultural sectors of Kenya and C￿te d’Ivoire constitute valid success 
stories in terms of its sustainability and their impact on rural incomes and poverty?  
•  What factors have contributed to the success (or lack thereof) in the horticultural 
sector?   
•  To what degree can the positive aspects of horticultural sector be replicated in other 
African countries?   
In spite of the rapid growth of the horticultural sector in Kenya, the answer to the first 
question is not obvious.  First, some observers see a trend toward consolidation, in which 
small farmers are gradually being squeezed out of the lucrative export market for 





rising concern over the environmental and labor conditions at the farm-level are pushing 
exporters to work with larger farmers, who can more easily document their production 
practices (Dolan et al. 1999).  Second, it is not clear whether trade liberalization under the 
World Trade Organization will benefit African horticultural exporters, by further opening 
European markets, or hurt them by eroding some of the preferential access to the European 
market that they currently enjoy (Stevens and Kennan 1999).  And third, the fact that small 
farmers produce most of the exported fruits and vegetables certainly suggests a poverty-
reducing impact, but it is difficult to make any definitive statement without better 
information on the number of beneficiaries, the characteristics of the growers, and the size of 
the gains. 
Even if we assume, for the moment, that the horticultural sectors in Kenya and C￿te 
d’Ivoire are success stories in terms of growth, poverty impact, and sustainability, an 
important question is whether there are lessons that can be applied to other African countries 
interested in helping small farmers participate in profitable export markets for horticultural 
goods.  In other words, are the factors behind their success related to public policy and 
investment that other countries can emulate?  Or is the success based on historical, climatic, 
and geographic factors that cannot be replicated elsewhere?  To answer these questions, it is 
necessary to understand the historical development of horticulture.  We are particularly 
interested in the role of policy, the regulatory environment, and public investment in 
facilitating the growth of the sector over time.   
This paper discusses the case of Kenya in some detail because it is the most widely 
recognized success story in horticulture, because the growth of its horticultural sector in 





light on the characteristics of horticultural growers in Kenya.  The case of C￿te d’Ivoire is 
discussed more briefly, mainly to provide a basis of comparison with the Kenyan case.  Some 
of the similarities between the two countries serve to reinforce the assessment of factors 
behind success, while the contrasts demonstrate the diversity of experience across countries.   
Horticulture is generally defined to include fruits, vegetables, flowers, and 
ornamental plants.  In this report, we focus on the fruit and vegetable sector.  Although cut-
flower exports account for about half of Kenyan horticultural exports (see Table 1) and are 
growing rapidly in C￿te d’Ivoire, the cut-flower sector is dominated by large-scale capital-
intensive operations
4. 
Table 1--Export values for fresh fruits, vegetable, and cut-flowers  
1992-1999 (Million Kshs) 
Year Fruits  Vegetable  Cut-flowers  Total 
1992 358  909  1,247  2,512 
1993 489  1,700  2,482  4,672 
1994 536  1,797  2,637  4,971 
1995 617  2,204  3,642  6,464 
1996 769  2,577  4,366  7,701 
1997 805  3,116  4,887  8,809 
1998 819  4,052  4,856  9,728 
1999 1,256  5,713  7,235  14,204 




Thus, the fruit and vegetable sector is a more promising topic to understand the challenges of 
involving (and keeping) smallholders in an expanding export sector.  Definitions of ￿fruits 
and vegetables￿ also vary.  The statistical database of the Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) uses a broad definition that includes nuts (including cashew nuts), legumes, starchy 
root crops, and sugar crops such as sugarcane.  Other studies focus narrowly on fresh fruits 
and vegetables.  In this study, we exclude nuts, legumes, starchy root crops, and sugar crops, 
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but include both fresh and processed fruits and vegetables.  Nonetheless, because we use data 
from various sources, some discrepancies in definitions are unavoidable.   
The paper is divided into seven sections.  Section 2 examines the historical 
background of horticultural development in Kenya, attempting to identify the driving forces 
behind the growth of this sector.  In Section 3, we examine the economics of horticultural 
production and marketing in order to assess the impact of horticultural on the livelihoods of 
growers.  Section 4 examines the characteristics of fruit and vegetable growers, using survey 
data and case study interviews. Section 5 summarizes the channels used in marketing fruits 
and vegetables in Kenya.  Section 6 examines the fruit and vegetable export sector in C￿te 
d’Ivoire in order to provide a point of comparison with the Kenyan case study.  And Section 
7 summarizes the results and draws some lessons for policy.   
 
2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF KENYAN HORTICULTURE  
The growth of the Kenyan fruit and vegetable sector has not been a smooth, 
continuous process.  Rather, the sector has expanded in fits and starts, with numerous 
changes in the commodity mix, the role of the state, the types of marketing institutions, and 
the characteristics of the participating farmers.  Any division of this complex process is 
somewhat arbitrary, but for the purposes of presentation it is useful to divide the evolution of 
the sector into five periods: the pre-war colonial period, the post-war colonial period, the 
early independence period, from 1974 to 1990, and since 1990.   
PRE-WAR COLONIAL PERIOD  
Kenya was made a protectorate of Great Britain in 1895 and a British colony in 1920.  





According to Hill (1956), the Imperial British East African Company was experimenting 
with temperate fruits and vegetables as early as 1893.  In 1901, colonial white settler farmers 
founded the East African Agricultural and Horticultural Society (presently the Agricultural 
Society of Kenya).  At the same time, Indians recruited to construct the Kenya-Uganda 
railway had introduced Asian vegetables
5, which today accounts for about 10% of the total 
volume of the country￿s fresh horticultural exports.  
The beginnings of Kenya￿s formal horticultural research activity also traces to the 
period.  According to M￿Ribu et. al (1993), the colonial government was, by 1911 
experimenting with tropical fruits at Matuga along the Indian coast (this later became the 
Matuga Agricultural Research Station).  Later in 1920, a second experimental site for tropical 
fruits was established close to where the National Agricultural Laboratories is currently 
located.  In 1931, the Department of Agriculture embarked on a plant introduction service to 
facilitate the adoption of and expansion of area planted with crops developed in the 
experimental stations.   
According to Martin (1973, cited in Jaffee 1995), trade in small quantities of 
vegetables and tropical fruits already existed along the coast with Arab and Indian traders 
exporting the produce to Zanzibar.  In the 1930s, low commodity prices motivated some 
European farmers to grow passion fruit.  Four small factories were constructed to produce 
passion fruit juice for export to South Africa and Australia.  A Passion Fruit Board was 
created by the colonial authorities to provide technical assistance and regulate trade.  
However, the quantities were modest, and both production and processing collapsed with the 
disruption of trade during World War II (Jaffee 1994).   
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Thus, the roots of the commercial horticultural sector were established during this 
period. Lack of official attention to marketing of horticultural produce resulted in a situation 
in which any impetus for expanding the production or commercialization of horticulture 
came from the private sector.  However, given the limited domestic market and the high costs 
of transportation to external markets, it is debatable whether more supportive policies and 
public investment would have stimulated more rapid development of the sector.   
POST-1940 COLONIAL PERIOD 
World War II stimulated the development of horticultural production and processing 
in two ways.  First, regular trade flows were disrupted by hostilities, reducing the availability 
of imported horticultural goods.  Wartime regulations meant tight controls on imports, 
particularly on commodities not considered essential to the economy.  As a result, domestic 
producers and processors benefited from a larger domestic market, even if consumers were 
paying higher prices for the goods.   
Second, faced with high wartime-demands, especially for provisions to the Allied 
forces in North Africa and Middle East, the authorities launched a project to produce 
dehydrated vegetables.   As part of this project, dehydration factories were constructed in 
Kerogoya and Karatina.  Some of the raw materials were supplied by large ￿nuclear estates￿ 
managed by the processors.   Much of the raw material supplies, however, was sourced from 
small-scale African farmers in the surrounding areas. To boost production, irrigation schemes 
were developed in swampy areas for collective farming by African.   These farmers were 
organized to supply potatoes, cabbage, carrots, and other vegetables to the factories.  They 
were given improved seed, technical assistance, and a guaranteed market for their output.  In 





sourced from 13,500 small-scale farmers.  After the war, the demand for dehydrated 
vegetables by the military dried up.  Although there was some consideration of the option of 
maintaining the two factories, there was opposition from settlers who had established their 
own canneries during the war.  By 1947, both plants were dismantled.  
As Jaffee (1995) notes, the scheme was relatively short-lived, but was a pioneering 
effort in several ways.  It demonstrated that African farmers could be mobilized for 
commercial agricultural production of new crops if inputs, technical assistance, and a stable 
market could be provided.  This model was later adopted in various cash-crop programs such 
as the one implemented by the Kenya Tea Development Authority.  In addition, it 
represented one of the earliest large-scale irrigation schemes, again serving as an example to 
be followed later, most notably in the Mwea Irrigation Scheme.   
This period also saw the expansion of experimental works started in the previous 
period.  By 1946, experimentation with tropical zone fruits had expanded to Tigoni (now the 
location of the Potato Research Centre), Molo and Kitale agricultural research stations and in 
1955, the Perkerra Irrigation Research Station started work on hot season fruits and 
vegetables.  The National Horticultural Research Center was started in 1957 at Thika.   
In the late 1940s, two British companies built pineapple-canning factories in Kenya to 
supply the United Kingdom.  When they started operations, both factories sourced their raw 
material from large-scale settler farms.  In 1954, the Swynnerton Plan called for government 
assistance to increase the participation of smallholders in the production of cash crops such 
as coffee and tea.  Part of this plan was to increase the role of smallholders in supplying raw 
materials to the pineapple processing plants.  Smallholders were subsequently provided with 





number of serious problems including under-staffing, production in inappropriate zones, and 
violence associated with the independence movement.  In spite of these problems, 
smallholders accounted for 75 percent of the supply of pineapples to these factories by the 
early 1960s (Winter-Nelson 1995; Kimenye 1995; Jaffee 1994).   
Thus, during the post-war colonial period, horticultural development was still very 
limited.  At independence, in 1963, fruit and vegetable exports were just US$ 3.8 million (or 
US$ 19 million in 1995 dollars), representing less than 3 percent of agricultural exports (see 
(Figure 1).  Nonetheless, the wartime dehydrated vegetable scheme demonstrated the 
feasibility of engaging smallholders in commercial horticultural production, given the right 
institutional support.  And the Swynnerton Plan provided further support for the concept of 
smallholder production of commercial crops, even if the implementation was plagued with 
difficulties.   
EARLY INDEPENDENCE  
Independence brought three significant changes to the horticultural sector in Kenya.  
First, the new government came into power giving higher priority to improving conditions 
for the African majority.  A land reform program was launched in which the government 
purchased most of the land farmed by Europeans (particularly in the western highlands) and 
distributed it to tens of thousands of African smallholders.  Because of the relatively good 
soils and location of this region, this program expanded the opportunities for smallholder to 
become involved in horticulture and other forms of commercial agriculture.  Furthermore, 
social considerations weighed heavily in public investment and regulatory decisions.   A 
series of state enterprises were created (some from analogous colonial organizations) to 





The second change was the creation of the Horticultural Crops Development 
Authority (HCDA) in 1967.  Although the marketing boards for other crops generally played 
a direct role in buying and selling agricultural commodities, often with a legal monopoly on 
marketing, the HCDA played a more facilitative role, attempting to coordinate various 
participants in the industry
6.  This was partly a matter of practical necessity, since HCDA had 
limited staff and resources.  Even with a larger budget and staff, however, state enterprises 
rarely have the agility and skills necessary to deal with the diversity of the sector and the 
perishability of the product.  Several researchers have noted that the fact that the HCDA did 
not attempt to directly manage and control horticultural trade probably allowed the sector to 
develop more rapidly (Kimenye 1995; Djikstra 1997; and Harris et. al 2000).   
The third change in the post-independence period is the growth of international 
investment in the Kenyan horticultural sector.  The most important example of this was the 
entry of Del Monte into the Kenyan pineapple sector.  In 1965, one of the two pineapple 
factories, Kenya Packers, came under the control of Del Monte (then called the California 
Packing Corporation), the largest fruit processor in the world.  Although Del Monte invested 
in the factory and applied its technical and marketing expertise, the sector grew slowly and 
remained only marginally viable.  According to Del Monte: 
In spite of a Government-sponsored drive to encourage quality pineapple production 
by smallholders, it soon became clear that these smallholders could not provide the necessary 
quantities on a regular basis to keep the canning plant consistently and profitably in 
operation.  Many outgrowers chose instead to sell their crop to the local fresh fruit market 
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where they could fetch better prices, while much of the locally grown fruit was not of a 
quality suited to the demands of Del Monte￿s stringent standards (Del Monte, 1988).   
In 1968, Del Monte arranged to lease 9000 hectares of land from the government to 
develop a nucleus estate to produce pineapple for the factory.  This would insulate Del Monte 
from changes in pineapple supply due to farmers selling on the fresh market or switching to 
coffee when world prices were high.  Furthermore, mechanization and hormone applications 
allow the estate to spread production over much of the year, keeping the plant in operation 
longer.  The capacity of the processing plant and the nucleus estate were expanded over time 
and, by 1974, purchases from smallholder outgrowers was discontinued.    
In addition to Del Monte, other international companies came to invest in Kenya.   A 
joint venture was formed between Cottees, an Australian firm, and a government parastatal.  
Kenya Fruit Processing (KFP) developed processing facilities and tried to stimulate local 
production.  The Horticultural Crop Development Authority (HCDA) assisted by providing 
seedlings, sprayers, chemicals, and other inputs on credit.  By the early 1970s, KFP was one 
of the largest exporters of passion fruit juice in the world (Jaffee 1995).   
Not all of the foreign investment projects were successful.  A joint venture between a 
British company and a Kenyan parastatal established a vegetable dehydration plant in 
Kinangop, a cool, highland area with a new smallholder settlement scheme but relatively low 
agricultural potential.  The government￿s interest in the scheme was to provide a marketing 
outlet for resettlement farmers in Kinangop, while the foreign partners were attempting to 
develop a viable commercial operation.  Conflicts between these two objectives occurred 
often and by 1968, the company was close to bankruptcy.  The government purchased the 





continued to incur losses.  In 1973, a new joint venture with a German firm was implemented 
with a more commercial orientation.  The scheme did well in the mid-1970s, but eventually 
closed in 1982.  The international market for dehydrated vegetables had contracted, while the 
local market for fresh vegetables had expanded and resulted in significant ￿leakage￿ that the 
company could not control.   
Thus, the early independence period was characterized by more active support for the 
incorporation of smallholders in commercial agriculture, the formation of the Horticultural 
Crops Development Authority, and increasing investment in horticulture, including 
international investment.  The processing sector was dominated by joint ventures between 
foreign companies and state enterprises, often working toward different objectives.   Between 
1963 and 1974, fruit and vegetable exports grew from US$ 3.8 million to US$ 10 million, 
representing a growth rate of 4.4 percent per year in real terms. The contribution of fruits and 
vegetables to total agricultural exports remained at slightly less than 3 percent because other 
agricultural exports grew at a similar rate (see Figure 1). 
TAKE-OFF (1974-1990)  
Starting around 1974, Kenyan fruit and vegetable production and exports began to 
grow more rapidly.  Overall, fruit and vegetable exports rose to US$ 95 million in 1990 or 
8.0 percent per year in real terms over the period 1974-90.  The importance of fruit and 
vegetable exports in overall agricultural exports increased dramatically during this period.  
Whereas fruits and vegetables accounted for about 3 percent of agricultural export earnings 
in the 1960s and early 1970s, by 1990 its contribution had reached 14 percent (see Figure 1).  
In the mid-1970s, this growth was driven by investments that increased the capacity 





pineapple product exports grew more than six-fold, so that, by 1977, they accounted for 65 
percent of Kenyan fruit and vegetable exports.  In contrast, the growth in the late 1970s and 
1980s was driven by the growth in exports of fresh vegetables and, to a lesser degree, fresh 
fruit (see Figure 2).  The diversification into fruits and vegetables was partly motivated by 
world commodity prices. After peaking in 1977, coffee and tea prices fells sharply in the 
following years, forcing many farmers to look for alternative income-generating crops.   
Figure 2--Trends in the composition of Kenyan fruit and vegetable exports  





































































Source: FAOStat for agricultural statistics and U.S. Department of Commerce for U.S. consumer price 
index. 
 
At the same time, export demand for vegetables grew in the 1970s as an indirect 
effect of the expulsion of the South Asian community from Uganda under the regime of Idi 
Amin.  Many of these refugees resettled in the United Kingdom, contributing to the growing 
Asian community there and a demand for Asian vegetables.  Kenya offered several 





Asian vegetables throughout the year instead of on a seasonal basis.  In addition, Kenyan 
smallholders already had experience growing Asian vegetables for the local Asian 
community.  In fact, there were small exports of Asian vegetables to the UK as early as 1952 
(Kimenye 1995).  And finally, the presence of an Asian community in Kenya meant that 
there were family and social ties between Asian traders in London and those in Nairobi, 
reducing the risk and transaction costs in expanding this trade (Djikstra 1997).   
Another factor in the growth of fresh fruit and vegetable production is the growth in 
the Kenyan tourism industry.  By 1980, Kenya was receiving 372 thousand international 
tourists per year, more than any other African country after South Africa (World Bank 2002).  
Although canned goods can be transported by ship from Africa to Europe, fresh produce 
generally must generally be air-freighted
7.  When export volumes were too small to justify a 
charter cargo jet, the cargo capacity of passenger jets provided a means of air-freighting 
Kenyan produce to Europe (later, as volume increased, cargo jets were used more widely).  
In addition, the tourism industry increased the demand for high-quality fruits and vegetables 
by hotels and restaurants, giving Kenyan farmers more experience in horticultural production 
and an outlet for produce not meeting export standards.  Thus, the horticultural sector in 
Kenya has benefited from the development of Nairobi as a regional hub and as an important 
tourism destination.   
The growth in Kenyan horticultural exports is also linked to the increasing 
involvement of smallholders in the sector.  In the early 1970s, no more than several hundred 
smallholders were producing for the fresh fruit and vegetable export market, accounting for 
just 10-20 percent of the total volume.  As mentioned above, low international prices for 
                                                 
7 A major exception is bananas and pineapple.  As discussed in Section 6, C￿te d’Ivoire exports bananas and 
fresh pineapple to Europe on specially-designed refrigerated ships.   In fact, bananas are transported from Latin 





coffee and tea made it economical to involve smallholders in export horticulture.  Coffee 
prices boomed again in the 1980s, but by then many smallholders had acquired skills in 
horticultural production. At least as important, exporters began to recognize the potential of 
smallholder to meet the growing European demand.   By the mid-1980s, Jaffee (1995) 
estimates that there were 13-16 thousand smallholders involved in growing fresh produce for 
export.  They accounted for 40-65 percent of the supplies of French beans, Asian vegetables, 
mango, avocado, and passion fruit for export. 
The learning process required to organize smallholder production for export is 
illustrated by the history of Yatta.  Yatta has an irrigation scheme built in the 1950s and a 
resettlement community dating from the 1960s.  Vegetable marketing was limited, however, 
until the road connecting it to Nairobi was paved in 1980.  Yatta farmers formed a self-help 
group to find a reliable market for their vegetables.  The group linked up with Kenya 
Horticultural Exports, one of the largest fresh vegetable exporters.  Initially KHE contracted 
the group to provide vegetables, supplying seed and inputs on credit.  The system worked 
until other buyers began entering the region and ￿poaching￿ the output committed to KHE, 
allowing farmers to avoid repayment of loans.  Drought and non-repayment caused the 
collapse of the input supply system, but KHE continues to buy from the region, competing 
with many other traders (Jaffee 1995).  The export of fresh vegetables other than French 
beans was US$ 63 million in 2000 (see Table 2).  Although, it is difficult to document, much 






Table 2--Composition of Kenyan exports of fruits and vegetables (2000) 
 





Fruits 53,569  100.0 
   Canned pineapples  33,383  62.3 
   Pineapple juice    9,853  18.4 
   Fruit tropical fresh  5,153  9.6 
   Mangoes  2,556  4.8 
   Prepared fruit  821  1.5 
   Fresh fruit  595  1.1 
   Fruit juice  448  0.8 
   Pineapples  255  0.5 
   Apples  125  0.2 
   Citrus  102  0.2 
   Others  278  0.5 
Vegetables 113,100  100.0 
   Fresh vegetables  63,827  56.4 
   Green beans  37,584  33.2 
   Prepared vegetables  10,495  9.3 
   Frozen vegetables  504  0.4 
   Green peas  276  0.2 
   Leeks & other alliac. veg  183  0.2 
   Cabbages  155  0.1 
   Others  76  0.0 
Total 166,669   
Source: FAO Stat. 
.   
 
Smallholders also play an important role in growing French beans for export.  Fresh 
and canned French beans have become one of the most important horticultural exports from 
Kenya.  Although Kenya has long exported French beans to Europe, the volume began to 
increase in the 1970s.  Initially, exports were limited to the winter-spring months when 
European producers cannot supply.  However, the advantages of lower labor and land costs, 
combined with the rising need for suppliers that can provide produce throughout the year 
resulted in a shift toward sourcing French beans and other vegetables in North Africa and 
sub-Saharan Africa.  This growth was the result of continuous experimentation by farmers 
and traders with alternative institutional arrangements.  Jaffee (1995) describes the 
tumultuous history of Njoro Canners and Hortiequip as they tried alternative institutional 





repayment of loans.  At its peak, in 1990, this scheme had 24 thousand contracted 
smallholder farmers growing French beans and other vegetables.     
Not all fruit and vegetable production for export is grown by smallholders, however.  
Del Monte had been expanding its nucleus estate pineapple capacity for some years when, in 
1974, it stopped purchasing pineapples from smallholders and began relying entirely on its 
own production.  Technological change in production and increasing international 
competition were encouraging larger-scale operations and vertically integrated producer-
processor operations.  According to Jaffee (1994), the trend toward large-scale production of 
pineapple was occurring in other exporting countries such as the Philippines, Thailand, and 
Taiwan.  Del Monte canned pineapple exports increased by a factor of five between 1974 and 
1977, reaching 45 thousand metric tons.  Currently, Kenya exports US$ 33 million in canned 
pineapple, making it the most important horticultural export.  In addition, pineapple juice 
exports are in the range of US$ 10 million, making them the fifth largest horticultural export 
(see Table 2).   
Thus, this period was characterized by impressive growth in the production and 
export of fruits and vegetables, particularly pineapples, Asian vegetables, and French beans.  
By 1988, Kenya was the main supplier of fresh and chilled vegetables to the 12 countries 
then in the European Union (Dolan et al 1999). 
NEW CHALLENGES (1990 TO THE PRESENT) 
According to the FAO, the growth of Kenyan fruit and vegetable exports slowed in 
the 1990s.  The export value rose from US$ 95 million in 1990 to US$ 167 million in 2000, 
representing an annual growth rate of 2.7 percent in real terms.  Similarly, its share in overall 





2000 (see Figure 1).  On the other hand, statistics from the Horticultural Crop Development 
Authority (HCDA) show strong growth, at least in volume, during the 1990s (see Tables 4 
and 1).  The discrepancy may be related to different definitions of horticulture.  The FAO  
   
Table 4--Export volumes for fresh fruits, vegetables, and cut-flower 1992-2000 
Year Fruits  Vegetable  Cut-
flowers 
Total 
1992  11,232 26,323  19,806 57,363 
1993  11,697 26,765  23,635 62,119 
1994  13,079 26,878  25,121 65,178 
1995  13,865 32,126  29,373 71,758 
1996  16,869 32,742  35,212 84,523 
1997  17,450 30,880  35,850 84,180 
1998  11,350 36,800  30,220 78,370 
1999  15,595 46,377  36,992 98,964 














data refer to fresh and processed fruit and vegetables exports, while the HCDA figures 
include cut flowers, which have grown rapidly, and exclude processed fruits and vegetables, 
which have declined in the 1990s.  The difference may also reflect changes in the 
composition of horticultural exports or declining prices.     
Although revenue growth has slowed, fruit and vegetable exports have become more 
diversified.  The importance of canned pineapple in fruit and vegetable export revenue fell 
from 40 percent in 1990 to 20 percent in 2000 (see Figure 2).  This is partly due to the 
decline in canned pineapple exports (under pressure from Thailand and other exporters) and 
partly due to the expansion in fresh fruit and vegetable exports over this period.  Although 
French beans, Asian vegetables, canned pineapple, and avocados dominate exports, Kenya 





competition from C￿te d￿Ivoire, Morocco, Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Cameroon, Kenya 
continues to be the most important supplier of vegetables to the European Union.   
 Nonetheless, Kenya and other horticultural exporters face new challenges related to 
changes in the structure of consumer demand and to the transformation of the food retail 
market in Europe.  Kenya￿s ability to maintain and strengthen its role in horticultural exports 
will depend on its ability to adapt constructively to these changes.   
Rise of supermarkets   In 1989, 33 percent of the fresh fruits and vegetables in the 
United Kingdom were sold by supermarkets.  By 1997, this share had increased to around 70 
percent  (Evans 1999).  Furthermore, even among supermarkets, chains have increased their 
market share.  According to Dolan et al (1999), UK supermarket chains increased their 
market share in fresh fruits and vegetables from 63 percent in 1994 to 76 percent in 1997.  
This trend is also occurring in continental Europe.  Increasingly, these supermarket chains 
are bypassing wholesalers to negotiate directly with exporters in Kenya and other countries.  
This creates a more direct link between consumer demand in the importing countries and 
producers in the exporting countries.   In the interest of protecting their reputation, these 
supermarket chains are imposing new restrictions and even organizing production in 
developing countries.  The managing director of Homegrown (Kenya) Ltd, one of the largest 
horticultural exporters, stated that ￿Rarely [does] Homegrown grow anything unless a 
supermarket has programmed it.￿ (Evans 1999?). 
Increasing concern over food safety.  European consumers are increasingly aware of 
the health consequences of pesticide residues.  Even consumers who are not part of the 
growing ￿organic food￿ movement (which is stronger in Europe than in the United States) 





which obliged food retailers to demonstrate ￿due diligence￿ to ensure that the food they sell 
is safe.  In practice, this means that supermarkets have become much more involved in 
imposing requirements on how food is produced throughout the commodity supply chain, 
even to the degree of monitoring and controlling horticultural production in developing 
countries (Dolan et al 1999).  Minimum residue levels (MRLs) of pesticides have become a 
focal point for this concern.  The Fresh Produce Exporters Association (FPEAK) has 
produced a 31-page Code of Practice for growers (FPEAK 1999).  The Code covers 
employment practices, agro-chemical application procedures, land use guidelines, and so on.  
The last two pages provide a 14-step documentation procedure for ensuring the traceability 
of produce being handled by the exporter.  This is an important step in establishing a 
common set of standards regarding safe handling of fresh fruits and vegetables and 
disseminating the information.  However, some aspects of the Code imply significant costs 
and there are currently no enforcement mechanisms.   
Increasing demand for convenience.  European consumers, like those in other 
industrialized countries, are demanding some forms of prepared fresh fruits and vegetables.   
This preparation can includes washing, peeling, cutting, packaging in small units, pre-mixed 
vegetables, and so on.  Because these activities are labor-intensive, they raise the opportunity 
for adding value in the exporting country.  
Competition from other suppliers.   Kenya horticulture currently enjoys duty-free 
access to European markets as a result of the LomØ Agreement, which was recently renewed 
for the period 2000-2005.  Trade liberalization will, therefore, probably erode this 





eventually face greater competition from Egypt, South Africa, Chile, Brazil, and Thailand if 
the EU liberalizes imports. 
Even without trade liberalization, horticultural markets are highly competitive subject 
to rapid shifts in export competitiveness.  Jaffee (1995) describes the turbulent history of 
attempts to expand exports of dehydrated vegetables, passion fruit juice, and pineapple 
products, including several bankruptcies and government buy-outs.  Kenya lost the European 
fresh pineapple market to C￿te d￿Ivoire in the 1980s, it was squeezed out of avocado exports 
to Europe by the higher quality of Israeli and South African products, and it lost the 
European market for courgettes, sweet peppers, and other temperate vegetables by European 
and Mediterranean suppliers.  Yet it has shown resilience in finding new markets and 
expanding its exports of French beans, Asian vegetables, and cut flowers.  This experience 
suggests that it would be difficult for the government to ￿pick winners￿ in order to target 
assistance toward crops with high potential.  Export comparative advantage evolves 
continuously in response to changes in markets, technology, and other competitors.  A better 
strategy would be to provide infrastructure and other public goods and facilitate investment 
in general, allowing private firms to test the competitiveness of each sector.  
How have these trends affected the participation of smallholders in Kenya￿s fruit and 
vegetable export sector?   There is some concern that the expanding role of supermarkets and 
the increasing importance of food safety certification will result in consolidation of the fruit 
and vegetable export sector since only the larger exporters can provide the reputation, 
documentation, and volume that supermarkets are now demanding.   Furthermore, these 
shifts may lead to consolidation in horticultural production for export.  It is much easier for a 





handful of medium- and large-scale farms than it is to monitor 100 or 200 small-scale 
growers.   The concept of ￿traceability￿ has risen in prominence.  Only if a given lot of 
produce can be traced back to its original producer can the producer be held accountable for 
problems with quality or pesticide residues (see Dolan et al 1999 and Dolan and Humphrey 
2000).   
Estimates from the early 1990s suggest that over half of the export fruit and vegetable 
production was supplied by smallholders (see Kimenye 1995 and Jaffee 1995).  More 
recently, the Horticultural Crops Development Authority estimated that 40 percent of 
exported fruit and 70 percent of exported vegetables are produced by smallholders (Harris et 
al 2001).  Given the greater importance of vegetable exports, this implies that 55-60 percent 
of fruit and vegetable exports are still produced by smallholders.  Dolan and Humphreys 
(2000) make the case that smallholders are being squeezed out of export production because 
of the difficulty of ensuring compliance with food safety and quality requirements imposed 
by supermarkets and other buyers.  They argue that these requirements are leading exporters 
to grow their own produce or purchase from large-scale commercial farms.  According to 
their interviews with four leading exporters, just 18 percent of vegetables for export come 
from smallholders.   
On the other hand, these four large exporters are probably not typical of other 
exporters.  Furthermore, exporters may wish to under-report the share of their production that 
comes from smallholders to satisfy European buyers who are suspicious of smallholder 
quality control (Harris et al 2001).  Jaffee (2003) interviewed several dozen exporters and 
estimates that smallholders account for 27 percent of exported fresh vegetables and 85 






8.    He points out that, although the dominance of U.K. supermarkets has increased, 
about 60 percent of the Kenyan fresh fruit and vegetable exports are sold to U.K. wholesalers 
and other European countries which have much less strict food safety and quality 
requirements.   
 
3.  FRUIT AND VEGETABLE PRODUCTION 
Fruits and vegetables in Kenare grown on a wide range of different types of 
conditions, from small farms with less than two hectares using family labor to large-scale 
commercial farms with over 100 hectares and advanced technology.  This section describes 
some of the main patterns found in Kenyan fruit and vegetable production based on findings 
from previous studies, case studies drawn from our own farmer interviews, and the results of 
the 2000 Rural Household Survey (RHS).  The 2000 RHS was carried out by Egerton 
College, Tegemeo Institute, and Michigan State University.  The sample included 1512 rural 
households designed to be representative of the agricultural regions of Kenya
9.  The RHS 
collected information on crop production and marketing, the use of inputs, access to credit, 
income, and farmer decision-making regarding maize marketing and storage.  The income 
section gathered information on income from livestock operations, non-farm household 
enterprises, and wages.  For our analysis, we focus on the 1482 households (98 percent) who 
were involved in crop production.  
                                                 
8   Neither Dolan and Humphry (2000) nor Jaffee (2003) provide the definitions used to classify farms as small, 
medium, or large, but Ngigi (2002) defines smallholders as those farming 1-2 acres (0.2-0.4 hectares) in high-
rainfall zones and 5-10 acres (2-4 hectares) in semi-arid zones (Ngigi 2002). 
9  The sampling design excluded arid and semi-arid areas used primarily for extensive grazing.  It appears that 
the sample was designed to include large-scale commercial farms since the largest farm in the sample has 82 
hectares.  Even so, the small number of observations for large-scale farms (there are eight farms with more than 






Land   As mentioned above, fruits and vegetables in Kenya are grown on everything 
from tiny garden plots of 50 m
2 to industrial plantations covering hundreds of hectares.  The 
size of the farms varies across crops depending partly on the economies of scale in 
production and processing.  Pineapples for canning are grown by Del Monte on vertically 
integrated pineapple plantations covering 4,000 hectares (Del Monte, 1988).  The vertical 
integration allows Del Monte to stagger production using plant hormones, thus providing a 
steady supply of pineapples for processing.  In contrast, mango and avocado exports are 
produced largely by smallholders.  Jaffee (2003) reports that large-scale commercial growers 
have not been able to compete with smallholders who have lower labor costs and greater 
motivation to provide careful husbandry.     
French beans are grown by both small and large farms.  ECI (2001) distinguishes 
three categories of French bean grower.  Large commercial farms have 50-100 hectares and 
grow various types of vegetables for export using hired labor and modern technology.  They 
are either owned by exporters or have formal contracts with large exporters.  Small- and 
medium-scale contract growers may have as little as 0.25 hectares of French beans, but the 
exporter provides seed and sometimes chemicals on credit.  They hire about 15 laborers per 
hectare of French beans planted.  The third category is independent smallholders who have 1-
5 hectares but only plant a fraction of this with French beans.  Without a contract, they use 
less purchased inputs, often recycle seed, and sell at lower prices due to differences in quality 
and/or variety.    
One survey of farmers on a main road near Nairobi found that growers of 
horticultural export crops had owned an average of 2.7 hectares, compared to 1.2 hectares for 





Rural Household Survey: French bean growers had an average of 2.9 hectares, of which 0.8 
hectares were planted with French beans.  Three-quarters of the French bean growers had 
less than three hectares of land and 86 percent planted less than one hectare of beans, but one 
farmer planted more than 10 hectares of French beans. 
Irrigation    An estimated 84 thousand hectares of Kenyan crop land are irrigated, 
representing about two percent of the total.  Six large-scale public irrigation schemes account 
for 10 thousand hectares, most of which are devoted to rice and cotton production.  These 
schemes are operated by the National Irrigation Board which supplies inputs, dictates 
cropping decisions, and controls the marketing of the output of the tenant farmers.  The 
irrigated area under these large-scale schemes has remained stagnant over the last 30 years, 
and all have suffered problems of dependence on government subsidies, declining 
government services, and farmer complaints.  Indeed, two of the six schemes are essentially 
non-operational, while the largest one, the Mwea Irrigation Scheme, faced a tenant rebellion 
in 1998 in which farmers refused to deliver their rice to the NIB
10.  The near collapse of the 
rice input delivery system has prompted many farmers in the Scheme to turn to horticulture 
(Ngigi 2002; Kabutha and Mutero 2002; Onjala 2001).     
Another 40 thousand hectares are irrigated by large-scale private farms growing high-
value crops such as flowers and horticulture for export.  These farms use boreholds and water 
pumps, often distributing the water by drip irrigation.   
                                                 
10   The Mwea Irrigation Scheme (MIS) is the largest public irrigation scheme in Kenya, covering almost 6000 
hectares and supporting 3000 families.  Farmers in the scheme are tenants and are obliged to grow rice, 
following production methods specified by the National Irrigation Board (NIB).  Horticultural production has 
developed both inside and outside the MIS, sometimes using water diverted from the canals.  In 1998-99, the 
tenants rebelled against the NIB, refusing to sell their rice to the NIB and demanding better prices and more 
flexibility.  The services provided by the NIB to rice farmers have deteriorated, and many farmers have turned 





Finally, about 35 thousand hectares are under small-scale irrigation schemes.  
Although this categories includes some schemes supported by the government, the fastest 
growing category is farmer-organized smallholder irrigation systems in which a group of 
farmers share the cost of a pump and/or the distribution system.  In this system, only a small 
part of each farm, such as 0.25-0.50 hectares, is irrigated for high-value production, while 
maize and other staple foods are grown on the rest of the farm (Ngigi 2002). 
The rapid growth of smallholder irrigation systems has been accompanied by new 
irrigation technologies.  Small-scale drip irrigation systems have been introduced by 
missionaries, improved by the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute, and disseminated by 
local non-governmental organizations including the Fresh Produce Exporters Association of 
Kenya (FPEAK).  These range from a bucket system to cover 15 m2, a drum system to 
irrigate 75 m2, and an ￿eight-acre￿ system to irrigate 450 m2.  In addition, several types of 
pedal (treadle) irrigation pumps costing less than US$ 80 have been introduced.  ApproTEC, 
a local non-governmental organization, reports that 24 thousand of these pumps are being 
used by smallholders in Kenya and Tanzania, mainly for production of vegetables and other 
high-value crops (ApproTEC 2003; Sijali and Okumu 2002).   
According to the 2000 Rural Household Survey, described above, 12 percent of the 
1498 farmers interviewed owned any irrigation equipment and 2 percent reported owning a 
water pump.  Since 94 percent of Kenyan crop farmers grow at least some fruits and 
vegetables, it is clear that many farmers grow fruits and vegetables under rainfed conditions.  
Irrigation is, however, much more common among commercial vegetable growers, 
particularly among large-scale growers and those supplying export markets.  For example, 





compared to just 10 percent among other farmers.  In their survey of 120 farmers along the 
Nairobi-Meru road (an area of very good market access), McCulloch and Ota (2003) find that 
90 percent of smallholder growers of horticultural export crops had irrigation, compared to 
just 36 percent of non-horticultural producers.  Without irrigation, smallholders are not able 
to produce a steady supply of vegetables throughout the year, making them less interesting to 
full-time exporters.  Instead, they sell their output to traders for domestic sales or to brief-
case (seasonal) exporters. 
Seed   The use of purchased seed varies across crops, depending on the quality and 
cost of purchased seed as well as the ease of saving seed from the previous harvest.  Large 
commercial horticultural producers almost always use purchased seed or planting material, as 
do many small and medium contract growers.  The use of purchased seed is less common 
among independent smallholders.   Kimenye (1995) reports that imported vegetable seed is 
expensive for smallholders, while locally-produced seeds are of poor quality.  She reports 
that lack of access to high-quality seed is an important constraint to smallholders.   
Kenya has over a dozen seed companies, including both local and international 
companies.  Among the international seed companies represented in Kenya are Pioneer, 
Panaar, Monsanto, and Seminis.  The Kenya Seed Company is one of the largest and best-
known African seed companies, having fostered the dissemination of hybrid maize seed in 
Kenya in the 1960s and 1970s.  Formed as a private company in 1956, it became partly 
government-owned after independence, though it operates much like a private company.  In 
1979, the company purchased another seed company specializing in horticultural and flower 
seed.  Today, it sells over 100 varieties of vegetables, legumes, and root crops under the 





Regina Seeds, a subsidiary of Seminis, the largest supplier of fruit and vegetable seed in the 
world.  Regina distributes imported French bean seed and does not produce any locally.  It is 
estimated that 70 percent of the vegetable seed sold in Kenya is imported, the remaining 30 
percent being produced locally (Regina Seeds 2003)    
ECONOMICS OF HORTICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
In order to examine the impact of horticultural production on farm income, it is useful 
to examine the gross margins of fruit and vegetable production relative to the most common 
alternative.  The gross margin is defined as the value of output minus the cost of variable 
purchased inputs such as seed, fertilizer, pesticides, and hired labor (the implicit cost of 
family labor and land are not deducted). 
In this section, we provide a gross margin analysis of French bean production and 
maize-bean intercropping.  French beans are one of the most important horticultural exports 
produced by smallholders, and maize-bean intercropping was chosen as the basis of 
comparison because it is the most common cropping system in Kenya and one used by less 
commercially-oriented farmers
11.   
Table 5 shows the calculation of gross margins for maize-bean intercropping in 
Kirinyaga District.  Each hectare produces Ksh 21,600 of maize and Ksh 19,200 of beans, so 
the total value of output is Ksh 40,800 per hectare per season (about US$ 510/ha)
 12.  After 
subtracting the costs of land preparation, seed, fertilizer, and labor, the gross margin is Ksh 
13,060 per hectare per season (US$ 163/ha).  Kenyan farmers can often produce two maize-
bean crops per year, one in the long rainy season (March-July) and one starting in the short 
                                                 
11 It should be noted that maize-bean intercropping is also used by many commercially-oriented horticultural 
smallholders.  Very few Kenyan smallholders are specialized in horticulture to the point of not growing some 
maize for own consumption. 





rainy season (October-November).  The yields are lower in the second season because of the 
lower rainfall.  Thus, maize-bean intercropping generates gross margins of Ksh 20,000 to 
25,000 per hectare per year (US$ 250-312/ha/year).    
 
Table 5--Gross margin analysis for maize-bean intercropping  
 
Quantity Price Value per crop 
per hectacre 
Maize yield   1620 kg 13 Ksh/kg 21,600 
Bean yield  540 kg 36 Ksh/kg 19,200 
Gross value of output   40,800 
Land preparation   15 person-days1 0 0  K s h / pers.day 3,705 
Maize seed  20 kg 270 Ksh/2 kg  2,700 
Bean seed   48 kg 30 Ksh/kg 1,440 
Fertilizer    
      23:23:0   2 bags 1250 Ksh/bag 2,500 
      CAN   2 bags 950 Ksh/bag 1,900 
 Dust against maize borer   3 kg 150 Ksh/kg 450 
 Labor    187 person-days 80 Ksh/pers.day 15,000 
Total variable cost   27,740 
Gross margin   13,015 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture & Rural Development, Kirinyaga District: 2002 Farm Management District 
guidelines. 
Note:  Typically, maize/bean intercropping allows one or two harvests per year depending on rainfall. 
 
These results should be interpreted with some caution, however.  Yields, prices, and 
costs vary widely across the country.  In more favorable regions such as the Western 
Highlands, maize yields are often in the range of 3-5 tons/ha.  At 4 tons/ha (and assuming 
other values are the same), the gross margin would be Ksh 43,460 per hectare (about US$ 
540/ha).  Second, the returns to the farm household will generally be higher than the gross 
margin, because will earn part or all of the ￿labor￿ budget, depending on how many of the 
tasks they carry out themselves.  Third, these estimates were based on guidelines from the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, but farmers typically use less fertilizer than 





Table 6 gives the gross margin for French bean production.  The gross value of output 
is Ksh 445 thousand per hectare per season.  This figure is much higher than that of maize-
beans because the yield of French beans is higher and because the price is higher.  After 
deducting the cost of inputs, the gross margin is Ksh 158 thousand per hectare.  This estimate 
is somewhat higher than other estimates that the ￿profits￿ per farmer range between 62,000 
and 124,000 Ksh per hectare (ECI 2000).  In addition, these are margins per season and it is 
often possible to produce three crops per year under rain-fed conditions and even more under 
irrigation.  Again, it is important to stress the variability in prices, yields, and costs.  Kamau 
(2000) reports on a survey of the cost of producing French beans in five production zones.  
The estimated cost ranged from 18 Ksh/kg to 30 Ksh/kg.   
Table 6--Gross margin analysis for French beans  
  Value (Ksh) 
  Quantity Price Per acre  Per hectare
Gross value of output   4,000 kg 45 Ksh/kg 180,000 444,780 
Seed bean  16 kg 700 11,200 27,675 
Fertilizer   
         23:23:0  4 bags 1,250 Ksh/bag 5,000 12,355 
         17:17:0  4 bags 1,250 Ksh/bag 5,000 12,355 
         CAN  2 bags 950 Ksh/bag 1,900 4,695 
Fungicides 41,500  102,547 
Labor   
         Land preparation  15 person-days 100 Ksh/pd  
         Planting  30 person-days 100 Ksh/pd 3,000 7,413 
         Harvesting   89 person-days 300 Ksh/pd 26,667 65,894 
         Weeding  75 person-days 80 Ksh/pd 6,000 14,826 
         Spraying  5 times 600 Ksh/time 3,000 7,413 
Total variable costs   103,267  255,173 
Gross margin (Ksh/season)   76,733  189,607 
Source: Interviews with farmers. 
Note: Up to three seasons of French beans can be harvested in a year under rain-fed conditions and up to five 
seasons under irrigation. 
 
Accepting the gross margins estimated in the two tables, it appears that the returns per 





bean intercropping.  These results seem to imply that farmers should convert all their maize 
to French bean production.  In fact, the gross margin analysis omits some important factors.   
•  First, the price used in the analysis is based on what existing French beans growers 
receive.  The price faced by farmers in more remote locations could be much lower or 
even zero if vegetable traders do not come to the area and it is costly for the farmer to 
get the crop to market.   
•  Second, the analysis does not take into account the implicit costs associated with 
family labor.  Vegetable production is significantly more labor-intensive than maize-
bean production.  French bean production requires 1300 person-days per hectare per 
year, and chili, okra, tomatoes, onions, and brinjal require 540-690 person-days, but 
maize and beans require just 175 person-days (Scheltema 2002).  Given the 
seasonality of labor demand and the need to grow food crops, few households have 
sufficient family labor to grow more than 0.20 hectares of vegetables.  For example, 
in the Egerton/Tegemeo/MSU Rural Household Survey (described in Section 4), the 
average plot of French beans was 0.15 hectares and, of the 78 farmers growing 
French beans, the largest plot was 1.2 hectares.  This is also true for other vegetable 
crops and, to a lesser degree, for fruits grown by smallholders. 
•  Third, the water requirements of French beans (and horticultural crops in general) are 
much greater than those of maize-bean intercropping.  If irrigation is required, the 
average investment cost ranges from US$ 1000/hectare for a gravity-fed, open-canal 
system to US$3100/hectare for a pump-fed, piped-distribution system (Ngigi 2002).      
•  Fourth, the analysis does not take into account the financial costs associated with 
much larger up-front variable costs.  Compared to maize-bean intercropping, the per-
acre variable cost of tomato production is three times a high, while those of French 
bean production are ten times greater.  If the farmer has sufficient liquidity or access 
to credit, then the interest costs should be included in the analysis.  If not, then 
horticultural production is simply not feasible.   
•  Finally, the analysis does not take into account risk.  Most fruits and vegetables are 
subject to more production risk than staple crops, due to attack from pest and/or poor 
weather, as well as greater marketing risk, due to its perishability.   
In summary, the gross margin analysis shows that when the right conditions are 
present in terms of rainfall, markets, family labor, and household ability to bear risk, French 
bean production can be much more profitable than maize-bean intercropping.  At the same 







4.  CHARACTERISTICS OF FRUIT AND VEGETABLE GROWERS 
To better understand the impact of horticultural production on small farmers in 
Kenya, it is useful to examine the characteristics of the growers.  For example, the impact of 
horticulture on rural livelihoods will be more limited if fruits and vegetables are only grown 
in one small area or by a small number of farmers.  Similarly, the impact on poverty depends 
on whether poor farmers are able to participate in the sector or whether richer, large-scale 
growers dominate it.   
A recent study compared the characteristics of smallholders producing horticultural 
crops for the export market, farm workers on large horticultural farms, and smallholders not 
involved in horticulture
13.  It found that export horticultural smallholders were significantly 
better off than non-horticultural smallholders, even after controlling for household 
characteristics such as age, education, ethnicity, and ownership of land.  The authors suggest 
that these farmers benefit directly from the higher income and indirectly through greater 
access to credit and extension services (McCulloch and Ota 2002).  As noted by the authors, 
however, this study was based on a relatively small sample of 141 rural households in 
selected zones near Mt. Kenya.   
This section sheds light on the characteristics of horticultural growers using two 
sources of information.  First, we examine the results of the Rural Household Survey 
(described in Section 3) regarding the characteristics of fruit and vegetable growers and the 
contribution of this activity to household income. Second, to provide more concrete images 
of the potential impact of participation in the horticultural sector, we describe a number of 
case studies, based on interviews carried out by one of the authors. 
                                                 
13   Another component compared urban households working in the horticulture packing houses with other 





RESULTS OF THE 2000 RURAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY  
According to the Rural Household Survey, carried out by Egerton College, Tegemeo 
Institute, and Michigan State University, the average farm household has 6.8 members and 
2.14 hectares of land.  The level of schooling for the heads of household is relatively low: 6 
years for male heads and 4 years for female heads (see Table 7). 
Table 7--General characteristics of Kenyan farmers 
Average age of head of household (years) 
Proportion of households headed by women (percent) 
Average amount of schooling completed by male heads (years) 





Average cultivated area (hectares) 
Average sown area (hectares) 




Land tenure  
     Own land with title deed  
     Own land without title deed 
     Only work on rented land 
     Only farmed on relative￿s land 








    Children below 15 yrs 
    Household member aged >15 years ≤65  
    Household member aged > 65 years 






Land preparation methods  
    Exclusively manual  
    Exclusively oxen 
    Exclusively tractor 
    Manual and Oxen 
    Manual and tractor 








Distance to a paved road 
    Less than 1 km  17% 
    1 ￿ 5 km  30% 
    5 ￿ 10  25% 
    10 ￿ 20 km  22% 
    More than 20 km  6% 
Source:  Egerton/Tegemeo/MSU Rural Household Survey 2000 
 
 
The average farm is relatively small, with 1.8 hectares of land cultivated in the main 
rainy season.  About two-thirds (65 percent) of the farmers in the sample were able to 
produce a crop in the short rainy season.  Adding the areas cultivated in the main rainy 





than half own land with a title deed, while another third have land but no title.  Most of the 
remainder farm land rented from others or borrowed from relatives.  With respect to 
technology, over half prepare their plots by hand, 19 percent combine manual preparation 
and rented tractors, and 17 percent combine manual preparation and the use of oxen (Table 
7). 
One measure of market access is the distance to a paved road.  According to the Rural 
Household Survey, somewhat less than half the agricultural households in Kenya live within 
5 kilometers of a paved road, while 6 percent live more than 20 kilometers from a road 
(Table 7).   
In order to examine the patterns in fruit and vegetable production, we divide the 
sample into different types of households, defined by per capita income, farm size, and 
region.  Table 8 shows the definitions used to create these categories.  About two-thirds of 
the farms have less than 2 hectares of sown area (adding cultivated area over the two 
seasons), and less than 3 percent have more than 10 hectares.  The poorest quintile of farms 
earn less than 8950 Ksh/person/year (roughly US$ 120), while the richest quintile of farms 
earn more than 65,150 Ksh/person/year (US$ 868).   
Table 8--Definition of household categories  




Farm size  <1 ha  Less than 1 ha sown area  514  34.9 
  1-2 ha  1-2 hectares sown area  475  32.3 
  2-5 ha  2-5 hectares sown area  391  26.6 
  5-10 ha  5-10 hectares sown area  58   3.9 
  >10 ha  More than 10 ha sown area  34   2.3 
Income per capita  Poorest  Less than 8950 Ksh  295  19.8 
  2  8950 ￿ 19,490 Ksh  294  20.3 
  3  19,490 ￿ 33,200 Ksh  295  20.2 
  4  33,200 ￿ 65,150 Ksh  294  20.2 
  Richest  More than 65,150 Ksh  294  19.5 
Province  East/Central/Coast  Lives in one of these provinces  465  31.6 
  Rift Valley  Lives in Rift province  499  33.9 
  West  Lives in West province  508  34.5 






Table 9 provides a summary key indicators of the fruit and vegetable sector.  The 
survey results indicate that almost all farmers (98 percent) grow fruits and vegetables.  On 
average, they grow 3.5 different types of fruit and 3.3 types of vegetables.  As a basis for 
comparison, the average number of different types of crops grown is about 12.  The average 
value of fruit and vegetable production is Ksh 49 thousand per year   (US$ 658), representing 
slightly less than one quarter of the value of crop production.  More than one-third (35 
percent) of fruit and vegetable production is sold on the market, though the share is higher 
for vegetables (49 percent) than for fruit (20 percent).  Overall, fruits and vegetables 
production is equivalent to about 18 percent of household income
14.   
                                                 
14   The contribution of fruits and vegetables to household income is somewhat less because this percentage 
compares the gross value of output with net income.  The survey data do not allow the calculation of net income 





Table 9--Fruit and vegetable production by income category 
    Income  quintile    
 Poorest 2 3 4  Richest  Total
Percent of farmers growing     
  Fruits  75 89 93 95  93  89
  Vegetables  78 87 93 96  97  90
  Fruits and vegetables  92 99 100 100  100  98
Average number of crops     
  Fruits  2.6 3.3 3.7 4  4  3.5
  Vegetables  2.3 2.7 3.1 3.9  4.4  3.3
  Fruits and vegetables  4.9 6.0 6.8 8.0  8.4  6.8
Avg value of production     
  Fruits  4,280 9,314 11,761 21,452  75,394  24,418
  Vegetables  3,525 7,874 11,086 29,163  73,295  24,965
  Fruits and vegetables  7,805 17,188 22,848 50,615  148,689  49,383
Value of production as % of total crop value     
  Fruits  13 14 11 10  11  11
  Vegetables  11 12 10 14  11  11
  Fruits and vegetables  25 26 21 25  22  23
Value of sales     
  Fruits  1,047 2,631 3,137 3,980  13,585  4,872
  Vegetables  1,131 2,531 3,737 11,982  41,537  12,171
  Fruits and vegetables  2,178 5,163 6,874 15,962  55,123  17,043
Sales as % of total crop sales     
  Fruits  11 12 7 4  7  7
  Vegetables  12 12 8 13  20  16
  Fruits and vegetables  23 24 14 18  27  23
Sales as % of production     
  Fruits  24 28 27 19  18  20
  Vegetables  32 32 34 41  57  49
  Fruits and vegetables  28 30 30 32  37  35
Value of production as % of household income     
  F r u i t s   1 2977   9   9
  Vegetables  9 8 7 10  9  9
  Fruits and vegetables  21 18 14 18  18  18
Source:  Egerton/Tegemeo/MSU Rural Household Survey 2000 
 
Poor and rich farm households differ somewhat in their production patterns
15.  Poor 
households are somewhat less likely to grow fruits and vegetables, but, even among the 
                                                 
15 Income per capita is calculated by combining estimates of crop income, livestock sales, animal product sales, 
household enterprise income, and income from wages and salaries.  In the case of crop income, we include the 
imputed value of home production as well as the value of crop sales.  In the case of both farm-size and income 
per capita, the categories are quintiles.  In each case (except for wages and salaries), the costs are production are 





poorest quintile, 92 percent do.  Similarly, the average number of different fruit and 
vegetable crops is greater among the higher-income farm households.  Even larger 
differences appear in the value of fruit and vegetable production: the richest quintile of farm 
households produces 18 times as much as the poorest quintile in value terms.  However, this 
merely reflects the greater agricultural production of high-income households.  The value of 
fruit and vegetable production as a percentage of total crop production does not vary 
appreciably across income categories (21-26 percent).  Nor does the importance of fruit and 
vegetable production in overall income show a trend across income classes, remaining in the 
range of 14-21 percent (see Table 9) 
Given their larger production, it is not surprising that the higher-income farm 
households market a larger share of their fruit and vegetable production.  The percentage 
rises from 28 percent among the poorest quintile to 37 percent among the richest quintile.  In 
fact, it is somewhat surprising that the share does not rise faster across income quintiles (see 
Table 9). 
Similar indicators for households in different farm-size categories
16 are shown in 
Table 10. Many of the patterns follow those found in the previous table: larger farms are 
more likely to grow fruits and vegetables, they grow a wider variety of fruit and vegetable 
crops, and the marketed share is higher for large farms than small.  On the other hand, the 
positive relationship between farm-size and the value of horticultural production is 
surprisingly weak.   
                                                 
16 Farm size is calculated as the sum of the areas of the fields cultivated by the household, including land rented 
in and excluding land rented out.  Double-cropped land is counted twice so it is, strictly speaking, a measure of 





Table 10--Fruit and vegetable production by farm-size category 
    Farm-size  category    
  <1 ha 1-2 ha 2-5 ha 5-10 ha  >10 ha Total
Percent of farmers growing   
  Fruits  88 88 92 91  91 89
  Vegetables  86 92 92 97  100 90
  Fruits and vegetables  97 98 99 100  100 98
Average number of crops   
  Fruits  3.2 3.5 3.7 4.1  3.7 3.5
  Vegetables  2.8 3.3 3.7 4.6  4.6 3.3
  Fruits and vegetables  6 6.8 7.4 8.6  8.3 6.8
Avg value of production   
  Fruits  20,157 22,485 30,879 31,953 28,684 24,418
  Vegetables  14,881 20,654 38,528 48,578 41,363 24,965
  Fruits and vegetables  35,039 43,139 69,407 80,531 70,047 49,383
Value of production as % of total crop value   
  Fruits  15 13 10 9  4 11
  Vegetables  11 12 12 13  6 11
  Fruits and vegetables  26 24 22 22  10 23
Value of sales   
  Fruits  2,338 3,516 7,453 18,385  9,403 4,872
  Vegetables  5,822 9,714 19,995 30,814  20,691 12,171
  Fruits and vegetables  8,159 13,230 27,448 49,199  30,094 17,043
Sales as % of total crop sales   
  Fruits  10 6 7 10  2 7
  Vegetables  25 16 18 16  4 16
  Fruits and vegetables  35 22 25 26  6 23
Sales as % of production   
  Fruits  12 16 24 58  33 20
  Vegetables  39 47 52 63  50 49
  Fruits and vegetables  23 31 40 61  43 35
Value of production as % of household income  
  Fruits  11 9 8 7  4 9
  Vegetables  8 9 10 11  5 9
  Fruits and vegetables  20 18 18 18  9 18
Source:  Egerton/Tegemeo/MSU Rural Household Survey 2000 
 
Furthermore, the importance of fruit and vegetable production (as a percentage of crop sales 
and as a percentage of household income) is actually greater among small farms than among 
large ones.  For example, fruit and vegetable production represents about 20 percent of 
income among farms with less than 1 hectare compared to just 9 percent among those with 





arid regions less favorable to horticulture.  In addition, because fruit and vegetable 
production is labor intensive, it is better suited to farms with an abundant labor and small 
plots. 
Table 11 examines the same indicators for three regions: the East, Central, and Coast 
provinces, the Rift Valley province, and the Western province.  The East/Central/Coast 
provinces are characterized by the highest value of fruit and vegetable production per farm, 
two to three times as large as in the other two provinces.  Not surprisingly, fruit and 
vegetable production in this region plays a larger role in crop production and household 
income than in the other two.  In the Rift Valley, the average production levels are lower, but 
the degree of commercialization is higher.  Almost half the fruit and vegetable output in this 
province is sold, according to the survey.  The Rift Valley is also more oriented to vegetable 





Table 11--Fruit and vegetable production by province 





Valley Western Total 
       
Percent of farmers growing   
  Fruits  98 81 89 89 
  Vegetables  95 95 81 90 
  Fruits and vegetables  100 99 96 98 
Average number of crops   
  Fruits  4.5 2.6 3.6 3.5 
  Vegetables  4.3 3.7 2 3.3 
  Fruits and vegetables  8.7 6.3 5.6 6.8 
Avg value of production   
  Fruits  47,431 9,755 17,755 24,418 
  Vegetables  52,563 17,905 6,637 24,965 
  Fruits and vegetables  99,994 27,660 24,393 49,383 
Value of production as % of total crop value       
  Fruits  14 5 14 11 
  Vegetables  15 9 5 11 
  Fruits and vegetables  29 14 19 23 
Value of sales   
  Fruits  5,325 4,245 5,075 4,872 
  Vegetables  25,005 9,293 3,249 12,171 
  Fruits and vegetables  30,330 13,538 8,323 17,043 
Sales as % of total crop sales   
  F r u i t s   6777  
  Vegetables  30 15 4 16 
  Fruits and vegetables  36 21 11 23 
Sales as % of production   
  Fruits  11 44 29 20 
  Vegetables  48 52 49 49 
  Fruits and vegetables  30 49 34 35 
Value of production as % of household income       
  Fruits  11 4 10 9 
  V e g e t a b l e s   1 3749  
  Fruits and vegetables  24 10 14 18 
Source:  Egerton/Tegemeo/MSU Rural Household Survey 2000 
 
 
Since averages can hide wide variation across households, it is useful to examine the 
variation in several key variables.  Table 12 shows the distribution of fruit and vegetable 





has no sales of fruits and vegetables.  An additional 20 percent less than 20 percent of their 
total output.  On the other hand, 23 percent of Kenyan farmers sell over half of their fruit and 
vegetable output.  The table also shows that the 6 percent of growers that market 80-100 
percent of their output account for fully 44 percent of the total fruit and vegetable sales.  
Table 12--Distribution of farmers by marketed share of fruit and vegetable production  
Sales as a  
percentage  




Percent of all 
farmers 
Percent of the 
value of F&V 
production 
Percent of the 
value of F&V 
sales 
     No sales  347  24  18  0 
       1   -   10  288  20  22  2 
     10   -   20  162  11  7  3 
     20   -   30  112  8  5  3 
     30   -   40  92  6  8  8 
     40  -    50  121  8  6  8 
     50  -    60  93  7  5  9 
     60  -    70  70  5  5  10 
     70  -    80  66  5  6  12 
     80  -    90  51  4  10  24 
     90  -  100  23  2  7  20 
    Total  1425 100 100 100 
Source:  Egerton/Tegemeo/MSU Rural Household Survey 2000 
 
As mentioned above, most growers have relatively small sales of fruits and 
vegetables, but a few farms have quite sizeable sales.  Table 13 shows the distribution of 
farmers according to their fruit and vegetable sales.  The average value of sales is relatively 
high, Ksh 17 thousand (US$ 226).  On the other hand, more than half the farmers have sales 
of less than 2,500 Ksh.  About 7 percent of them have sales of more than 50,000 Ksh (US$ 
667).  This group includes some quite large horticultural producers.  Although they are a 





Table 13--Distribution of farmers by the value of fruit and vegetable sales  





of all farmers 
Percent of the 
value of F&V 
sales 
             No sales  394  27  0 
            1 -        500  167  11  0 
       500   -    1,000  110  7  0 
    1,000   -    2,500  208  14  1 
    2,500   -    5,000  142  10  2 
    5,000  -   10,000  131  9  4 
  10,000  -   50,000  218  15  21 
  Greater than 50,000  102  7  72 
Total 1472  100  100   
Source:  Egerton/Tegemeo/MSU Rural Household Survey 2000  
 
 
How much does fruit and vegetable production contribute to the incomes of growers?  
Table 14 suggests that fruits and vegetables are merely a supplement to income for most 
farmers, but that a significant minority of farmers relies on fruit and vegetables for a major 
share of their income.  More specifically, over two-thirds of the farmers in the survey rely on 
fruit and vegetable production for less than 20 percent of income
17.  At the other extreme, 
however, 8 percent of the farmers earn over half their income from fruit and vegetable 
production.   
Table 14--Distribution of farmers according to the value of fruit and vegetable 
production as a percentage of income  
Value of fruit and 
vegetable production  
as a percentage 
of income  
Number of 
farmers 
Percent of all 
farmers 
Percent of 





            0  38  3  0  0 
      0    -   10  648  45  11  11 
     10   -   20  304  21  13  11 
     20   -   30  160  11  11  10 
     30   -   40  107  7  9  9 
     40  -    50  51  4  12  15 
     50  -    60  48  3  10  14 
     60  -    70  25  2  10  15 
     70  -    80  19  1  7  5 
     80  -    90  19  1  5  3 
     >90  20  1  11  7 
  Total  1,439  100  100  100 
Source:  Egerton/Tegemeo/MSU Rural Household Survey 2000 
                                                 
17 Because it is difficult to attribute all production costs to different crops, these figures compare the gross value 





We now turn our attention to the production and marketing patterns for specific fruit 
and vegetable crops.  Table 15 provides some indicators of the relative importance of each 
fruit and vegetable crop to Kenyan farms
18.  The first column shows the percentage of 
farmers growing each crop.  Only bananas and sukuma wiki
19 (greens) are grown by more 
than half of Kenyan farmers (69 percent and 63 percent, respectively).  Other crops grown by 
at least 30 percent of the farmers include avocados, mangoes, pawpaw (papayas), Irish 
potatoes, onions, pumpkin, and tomatoes.  It may seem surprising that just 4 percent of the 
smallholders in the survey reported grown French beans, since this commodity is the most 
important vegetable export from Kenya.  Since French bean production is concentrated in 
several production zones, the margin of error associated with French bean production 
estimates may be higher than for more widespread crops such as maize.  It is useful to recall, 
however, that there are close to four million small farmers in Kenya, so 4 percent would 
represent around 150 thousand farmers.  Since the local market for French beans is quite 
limited, it is likely that many of these farmers are growing, at least in part, for the export 
market. 
                                                 
18   The table shows only fruit and vegetable crops that are grown by at least 40 households (about 3 percent) in 
the 2000 Rural Household Survey.  Minor crops are included in the two ￿Other￿ categories. 
19  ￿Sukuma wiki￿ refers to collard greens, kale, and other greens.  The literal translation from Swahili is ￿push 














F&V total) (Ksh/year) 
(percent of 
F&V total) (percent)
Bananas 69 6,223 12 3,166  15 51
Avocado 35 8,276 16 1,032  5 12
Mangoes 31 5,038 10 413  2 8
Pawpaws 30 2,459 5 487  2 20
Guava 27 279 1 30  0 11
Lemons 15 347 1 40  0 12
Oranges 15 922 2 300  1 33
Passion fruit  14 306 1 66  0 22
Lugard 14 340 1 16  0 5
Matomoko 6 374 1 35  0 9
Pineapples 5 167 0 70  0 42
Mero 3 51 0 14  0 27
Other fruit  6 620 1 530  3 85
Fruit sub-total  89 25,402 48 6,199  30 24
Sukuma wiki  63 4,608 9 1,326  6 29
       Irish potatoes  38 5,602 11 2,694  13 48
Onions 35 1,961 4 934  5 48
Pumpkin 31 414 1 74  0 18
Tomatoes 30 4,533 9 3,371  16 74
Ndigenous vegetables  29 899 2 91  0 10
Cabbage 23 4,447 8 3,515  17 79
Spinach 11 591 1 39  0 7
Carrots 10 953 2 488  2 51
Peppers 10 253 0 39  0 15
Green peas  8 216 0 54  0 25
Green grams  7 291 1 23  0 8
Pumpkin leaves  7 26 0 1  0 4
French beans  4 779 1 732  4 94
Capsicum 4 326 1 252  1 77
Other vegetables  7 1,196 2 731  4 61
Vegetable sub-total  90 27,095 52 14,364  70 53
Fruit and vegetable total  98 52,497 100 20,563  100 39






The average value of fruit and vegetable production among Kenyan farmers is about 
Ksh 52 thousand (US$ 693), but this figure is heavily influenced by a small number of large 
growers.  The median value of fruit and vegetable production is just Ksh 14,096 (US$ 188).   
The most important fruits and vegetables in value terms are avocados (16 percent of the fruit 
and vegetable value), bananas (12 percent), Irish potatoes (11 percent), and mangoes (10 
percent).  Tomatoes, sukuma wiki, cabbage, and pawpaw are also important, each 
representing at least 5 percent of the total value of fruit and vegetable production (see Table 
15). 
Fruit and vegetable sales average somewhat less than Ksh 21 thousand (US$ 274) 
concentrated in a smaller number of crops.  Four crops (cabbage, tomatoes, bananas, and 
Irish potatoes) account for about 60 percent of the total value of fruit and vegetable sales (see 
Table 15). 
The degree of commercialization varies widely across commodities.  Some are grown 
almost exclusively for home consumption.  For example, no more than 5 percent of the 
pumpkin leaves and lugard are sold, and less than one-third of the pumpkins, peppers, 
avocados, mangoes, pawpaws, and guava are.  At the other extreme, more than 90 percent of 
the French beans (green beans) are marketed.  This is not surprising given that French beans 
are the most important vegetable export from Kenya.  Similarly, over half the output of 
bananas, tomatoes, cabbage, carrots, and capsicum are marketed.  Overall, 39 percent of the 
volume of fruit and vegetable production is marketed, the percentage being much higher for 
vegetables (53 percent) than for fruit (24 percent).  It is important to recognize however that 
this figure is weighted toward large farms that produce larger harvests.  If we calculate the 





household having an equal weight), the result is 27 percent.  In other words, a typical Kenyan 
household might sell about one-quarter of its fruit and vegetable production, but almost 40 
percent of the total value is marketed (see Table 15). 
How does the importance of individual crops vary across different types of 
households?  As shown in Table 16, the proportion of households growing selected crops
20 
shows little variation across farm-size categories.  Large farmers are slightly more likely to 
grow fruits and vegetables, but the difference is small.  For some crops, such as citrus, 
tomatoes, pumpkin, and onions, large farmers are more likely to grow them than small ones.  
For other crops, such as Irish potatoes, indigenous vegetables, bananas, avocados, and guava, 
there is no consistent pattern.   
Table 16--Percentage of farms growing each crop by farm-size category   
    Farm-size  category    
Crop  <1 ha 1-2 ha 2-5 ha 5-10 ha >10 ha  Total
Bananas 70 69 71 73 64  70
Avocado 39 33 36 22 30  36
Mangoes 26 32 35 53 33  32
Pawpaws 28 29 33 31 33  30
Guava 25 29 31 22 27  28
Oranges 11 15 19 33 33  16
Lemons 11 14 19 36 21  15
Lugard 15 16 13 9 9  15
Passion fruit  16 13 15 5 18  15
Other fruit  12 18 17 18 24  16
   
Sukuma wiki  56 63 71 67 73  63
Irish potatoes  38 39 37 42 27  38
Onions 32 34 37 56 52  35
Pumpkin 27 26 35 55 64  31
Indigenous vegetables  27 29 32 35 39  30
Tomatoes 20 33 36 35 39  29
Cabbage 17 23 28 40 24  23
Other vegetables  35 42 46 55 55  41
Source:  Egerton/Tegemeo/MSU Rural Household Survey 2000. 
                                                 
20 Fewer crops are shown in this table than in the previous ones.  Because we are disaggregating the results into 





It is interesting to note that small farmers are just as likely to grow the main horticultural fruit 
exports (avocados, and mangoes) as large farmers.   
But farm-size is only a rough indicator of the income or wealth of a family.  In Table 
17, the same figures are presented by income quintile, and the differences across categories 
are more marked.    
Table 17--Percentage of farms growing each crop by income category 
     Income  quintile    
Crop Poorest 2 3 4  Richest  Total
Bananas  49 67 72 78 84 70
Avocado  17 25 36 44 58 36
Mangoes  21 32 34 39 33 32
Pawpaws  22 32 35 37 25 30
Guava  22 29 26 33 29 28
Oranges  14 12 12 21 19 16
Lemons  12 16 15 18 15 15
Lugard  5 12 14 17 25 15
Passion  fruit  7 9 12 20 25 15
Other  fruit  7 13 15 19 25 16
    
Sukuma  wiki  45 55 66 71 79 63
Irish  potatoes  22 28 38 44 59 38
Onions  22 28 33 42 51 35
Pumpkin  25 28 30 36 35 31
Indigenous  vegetables  27 34 33 30 23 30
Tomatoes  20 24 28 37 36 29
Cabbage  11 12 19 31 42 23
Other  vegetables  27 34 37 52 56 41
Source:  Egerton/Tegemeo/MSU Rural Household Survey 2000. 
 
 Avocadoes, mangoes, passion fruit, Irish potatoes, cabbage, and many other crops are more 
likely to be grown by higher-income households than by poor households.  For example, 42 
percent of the richest income category grows cabbages, compared to just 11 percent of the 
poorest category.  Similarly, 58 percent of the richest farmers grow avocados, but just 17 





Unfortunately, causality is difficult to determine in this case.   It may be that high-
income households have more of the liquidity, access to credit, and appetite for risk that 
horticultural production often requires.  Alternatively, it may be that farmers (small and 
large) who engage in horticulture have higher incomes because of the relatively profitability 
of this sector.   A third possibility is that the two variables (income and horticulture) are 
correlated, but do not strongly influence each other.  For example, it may be that households 
that have good market access are more likely to grow fruits and vegetables and have higher 
incomes for other reasons, such as off-farm employment. 
Another measure of the importance of each crop is the value of production relative to 
household income.  Table 18 shows that small farms rely more heavily on fruit and vegetable 
production for their income.  The ratio falls from 26 percent among farms with less than 1 
hectare to 10 percent among those with more than 10 hectares.  This pattern holds true for 
both fruits and vegetables, particularly for bananas, pawpaws, guava, and sukuma wiki.  






Table 18--Fruit and vegetable production as a percentage of the total value of crop 
production by farm-size category 
   Farm-size  category     
Crop  <1 ha 1-2 ha 2-5 ha 5-10 ha >10 ha  Total
  B a n a n a s   33311   3
  P a w p a w s   66240   4
  G u a v a   32311   2
  M a n g o e s   11110   1
  L e m o n s   00000   0
  O r a n g e s   00011   0
  A v o c a d o   00000   0
  L u g a r d   00000   0
  P a s s i o n  f r u i t   00000   0
  O t h e r  f r u i t   00000   0
Fruit sub-total  15 13 10 9 4  11
  I r i s h  p o t a t o e s   22221   2
  T o m a t o e s   22242   2
  S u k u m a  w i k i   32411   3
  P u m p k i n   11121   1
  C a b b a g e   00001   0
  O n i o n s   10000   0
  I n d i g e n o u s  v e g e t a b l e s   12121   1
  O t h e r  v e g e t a b l e s   22242   2
Vegetable sub-total  11 12 12 13 6  12
Fruit & vegetable total  26 24 22 22 10  23
Source:  Egerton/Tegemeo/MSU Rural Household Survey 2000 
 
 
If we look at the ratio for different crops across income categories, the overall 
importance of fruits and vegetables is more-or-less constant.  Bananas are much more 
important in the income of poor households than in the income of higher-income households 
(see Table 19).  Pawpaws, onions, pumpkins, and tomatoes show similar but weaker patterns.  
But other crops show the opposite pattern, being more important in the income of richer 






Table 19--Fruit and vegetable production as a percentage of the total value of crop 
production by income category 
   Income  category     
 Poorest 2 3 4 Richest  Total
  B a n a n a s   65532   3
  A v o c a d o   11125   4
  M a n g o e s   12123   2
  P a w p a w s   23220   1
  G u a v a   10000   0
  O r a n g e s   11010   0
  L e m o n s   00000   0
  L u g a r d   00000   0
  P a s s i o n  f r u i t   00000   0
  O t h e r  f r u i t   01010   0
Fruit sub-total  13 14 10 11 11  11
  S u k u m a  w i k i   33332   2
  I r i s h  p o t a t o e s   11223   3
  O n i o n s   21111   1
  P u m p k i n   10000   0
  I n d i g e n o u s  v e g e t a b l e s   01110   0
  T o m a t o e s   22221   1
  C a b b a g e   21222   2
  O t h e r  v e g e t a b l e s   12232   2
Vegetable sub-total  11 12 11 14 11  12
Fruit & vegetable total  25 26 21 25 22  23
Source:  Egerton/Tegemeo/MSU Rural Household Survey 2000 
 
How do farmers supplying the fruit and vegetable export market differ from other 
farmers in Kenya?  The survey data does not identify export farmers, but we can get a rough 
picture of some of the differences by looking at French bean growers, since this is the most 
commercialized crop and a large portion of output is exported.   Table 20 compares the 
characteristics of French bean growers with other farmers, though the results must be 
interpreted with caution given that there are only 62 French bean growers in the sample.  
French bean growers appear to be similar to other farmers in farm-size, although the average 
farm-size is slightly larger and there may be a somewhat higher proportion of farms that are 





bean growers is no greater (and perhaps somewhat less) than that of other farmers.  On the 
other hand, there is a large difference in income, with French bean growers earning more 
than twice as much as other farmers.  Among French bean growers, only 8 percent are in the 
poorest quintile, while 38 percent are in the richest quintile.  Furthermore, as mentioned 
above, French bean growers are much more likely to own some type of irrigation equipment 
(50 percent) compared to other farmers (10 percent). 
Table 20--Comparison of French bean growers and other farmers 




Farm size category      
   <1 ha  35%  35% 
   1-2 ha  32%  30% 
   2-5 ha  26%  28% 
   5-10 ha  4%  2% 
   >10 ha  2%  5% 
    
Average farm size (sown area)   2.57 ha  2.15 ha 
    
Income quintile      
   Poorest  21%  8% 
   2  20%  15% 
   3  20%  13% 
   4  20%  25% 
   Richest  19%  38% 
    
Average per capita income  99,617 Ksh  48,568 Ksh 
    
Province    
   East/Cent/Coast  30%  58% 
   Rift Valley  35%  15% 
   Western  35%  27% 
Distance to paved road     
   Less than 1 km  17%  12% 
   1-5 km  30%  33% 
   5-10 km  24%  45% 
   10-20 km  22%  8% 
   More than 20 km  6%  2% 
    
Average value of assets  110,692 Ksh  139,019 Ksh 
    
Pct owning irrigation equipment  50%  10% 
    
Number of households  62  1548 
 







In terms of location, French bean growers are much more likely to live in the East, 
Central, and Coast provinces and much less likely to live more than 10 kilometers from a 
paved road (see Table 20).  French bean growers also appear to be concentrated in a few 
locations.  The survey sample is scattered across 24 districts, but over 70 percent of the 
French bean growers in the sample are found in just three districts: Meru, Makueni, and 
Vihiga
21.  Because of the small sample, it should not be inferred that these are the main 
production zones for French beans, but the results do indicate that French bean production is 
clustered.    
CASE STUDIES  
Survey data provides a comprehensive and balanced view of easily quantified 
variables, but it does not capture the dynamic nature of the attempts by farmers to improve 
their lives through by experimenting with different production methods, crops, and marketing 
strategies.  For this reason, it is useful to examine a number of case studies of Kenyan fruit 
and vegetable growers.  Information about these growers was gathered by the authors using 
semi-structured interviews carried out in March and April 2002.   
Case 1: Diversification from staples to vegetables 
Asha Muthori is a middle-aged woman who owns a five-acre piece of land on the 
banks of the Thiba River, a permanent river.    She started growing horticultural crops in 
1996 after observing that the neighbors that grew horticultural crops were better off than 
those who did not.  She also learned from the growers that returns from horticulture were 
                                                 
21  Meru is a high-rainfall district about 180 km northeast of Nairobi at the foot of Mount Kenya.  Makueni is 
about 150 km southeast of Nairobi along the road to Mombassa, and rainfall varies with altitude.  Vihiga is a 





generally higher than those from intercropping maize and beans, as she had been doing until 
then.   
She started with a crop of tomatoes, which she sold to traders who resold in  the main 
wholesale market in Nairobi.   Later, she started growing French beans and selling them to 
brokers buying for major exporters.  Last year, she joined the Kimuri Farmers Self-help 
Group and sold her French beans to an exporter through the Group.   She explained that sale 
through the Group has a number of advantages.  First, her output is too small to attract direct 
deals with a major exporter.  On her own therefore, she is constrained to sell to brokers at a 
price that is lower than that offered by major exporters.  As a group, however, members pool 
their produce to achieve volumes that attract direct negotiations with major exporters.   She 
stated that exporters offer a more reliable market outlet than brokers do.  In addition, the 
group deposits each farmer￿s payments directly in his/her personnel savings account, thus 
offering better security than cash transactions.  This also saves the farmer the cost of 
traveling to the bank, which are usually located in major urban centers, to deposit the money.  
At the same time, she pointed out a major weakness of selling through the Group.  
The fact that produce from member-farmers is pooled and presented to the buyer as one lot 
reduces the incentive to maintain quality control in production and handling.  Some members 
do not strictly follow the recommended production practices, and the low quality of their 
output reduces the quality and price of the entire lot.     
Asha stated that the well-being of her family has greatly improved since she started 
growing commercial horticultural crops.  In particular, she said that she used to have 
difficulties paying her children￿s school fees, so her children were frequently being sent away 





children have been able to attend school without interruption.  In addition, she said that she 
used to be forced to sell all her maize and beans at harvest to generate cash for school fees.  
This meant it was necessary to engage in causal wage labor to raise money for food.  Now, 
she is able to save some of her maize and bean harvest for own consumption.  Finally, she 
noted that she used some of the proceeds of the horticulture farming to buy a plot of land in 
Mombassa , which she plans to develop.   
When asked why other farmers in her area did not grow fruits and vegetables as a 
commercial activity, she cited lack of capital, especially money required to acquire a water 
pump.  Currently, her only other crop is a three acres intercrop of maize and beans. She also 
owns one dairy cow and a team (two) of plough oxen.  She ranks horticulture as her most 
important source of income, followed by dairy.    
Case 2: A trader is  unimpressed with vegetable production  
Nancy Wanjiru is a middle-aged woman who ventured into commercial horticultural 
farming two years ago.  Before then, she was a small-scale trader dealing in cereals but 
heavily dependent on hired transport to ship supplies from the production areas.  It was 
difficult for her to compete with larger traders because they could negotiate volume discounts 
when buying and transport their product at lower per-unit costs.  Because of her poor 
competitive position, she was on the look out for a better source of income.  She noticed that 
her sister￿s family, despite owning no land, was doing well by renting land and growing 
commercial horticultural crops.  Like her sister, Nancy does not own any land, but she rented 
four acres and started with tomatoes and cabbages, which she sold to traders mainly serving 
the city of Nairobi.  Last season she produced two acres of French beans, which she pooled 





Ms. Wanjiru said that the well being of her family has not changed with her shift to 
commercial horticultural farming and that she plans to shift back to trade business when her 
land lease expires.  She cited inadequate capital as the major reason for her lack of success 
with horticulture.  Without adequate working capital, she is not able to plant a crop of French 
beans on a weekly basis, which is essential for a continuous flow of produce and thus, cash.  
Further, the uncertainty of the continuity of land lease discourages her from investing in 
irrigation infrastructure.  During dry spells, she has to pay casual laborers to carry water from 
Thiba River, which about a kilometer from her plot.  She cites this as the major factor 
constraining other farmers in her area from growing fruits and vegetables as a commercial 
activity.   Her only other crop production consists of intercropping maize and sweet potatoes.    
Wanjiru cites lack of transparent in grading of the produce as a major marketing 
problem.  Instead of conducting grading at the produce collection center, the buyers collects 
the whole produce delivered, grades it at his own pre-cooling center in the absence of the 
farmer or his representative.  The group only gets figures of the quantities assigned the 
respective grades including the quantity rejected.  There are no verifying mechanisms.  She 
recommended that the government can assist horticulture farmers by designing and enforcing 
a more transparent grading system in which both parties (the farmers￿ representative and the 
buyer) are involved.     
Case 3: Tomatoes help pay for school fees 
Joseph Githiga is a 32 years old farmers who started growing commercial horticulture 
three years ago after he acquired an irrigation pump.  Before that time, he intercropped maize 
and bean and working as a casual laborer sorting tomatoes for other farmers.  He bought the 
pump out of savings from his causal labor and sale of maize and started growing French 





the major wholesale market in Nairobi, using hired trucks to ship the produce.  He continues 
to grow maize and beans on a two-acre plot of leased land and he raises chickens, but 
horticulture is now his main source of income. 
Mr. Githiga explained that the well-being of his family has greatly improved since he 
started growing commercial horticultural crops.  In particular, his family now eats better, and 
he pays his children￿s fees comfortably.   In addition, he has, out of the proceeds of the 
horticulture farming, bought a 1.5 acre plot of land where he is planning to settle his family.  
Current he lives on and cultivates a one acre section of his parent￿s land, but he feels he 
needs to move to his new piece of land to make room for his younger brother. 
He cited high petrol prices as a major constraint to the profitability of his enterprise, 
since he uses a petrol irrigation pump.  Marketing problem is his other major hindrance in the 
activity.  He feels that the market fee charged by the city council of Nairobi is excessive.  He 
and other traders have held talks with the municipal officials in charge of the market and are 
waiting for feedback.   According to Mr. Githega, the main factor constraining other farmers 
in the area from becoming involved in commercial horticulture is the lack of capital required 
to buy a water pump.   
Case 4:  An accounts-clerk turns to passion fruit 
Karimi is in his mid-thirties and started growing commercial horticulture in 1999.    
Before then, he was an accounts-clerk with the city council of Nairobi.  His major motivation 
came from the observation that a friend who had resigned from Unilever-Kenya to grow 
commercial passion fruit had improved his lot greatly.  Karimi resigned his job and uprooted 
his 0.25 acres of tea to plant passion fruit trees.  There was a strong market demand in both 
the local and export market.  The export market offers a higher price, but it is very 





Karimi had a bad start: after only one season, his first crop of passion fruit was completely 
destroyed by counterfeit fungicides.  The production of passion fruits is constrained by muthu birds, 
and protecting the fruit is very labor intensive.  Since then, the crop has done better and the well-
being of his family has greatly improved.  With the savings from passion fruit production, he bought a 
one-eighth acre plot in Kirinyaga town, where he plans to put-up a residential rental house.  He has 
also been able to take his son to a better school.   
He cited lack irrigation as the major factor constraining other farmers in his area from 
growing fruits and vegetables as a commercial activity. During dry spells, he has to pay casual 
laborers to manually carry water a bole-hole on the farm.  With regard to passion fruit growing, which 
is a fairly new activity in the area, he cited lack of knowledge about production methods, high costs 
of fruit tree planting, the long waiting period before the first harvest (about six to nine months), and 
labor-intensity as the major constraints.  When asked how the government could assist horticultural 
producers, he said that greater effort was needed to control the quality of agricultural chemicals and 
regulate input stockists.  He does not have any other agricultural enterprise. 
Case 5: A long-time horticultural grower  
Joyce Wambui and her husband have been growing commercial horticultural crops 
since they started a family in 1981.  They started with a tomato crop for sale.  Last season 
they cultivated a crop French bean.  At the time of this interview, they were harvesting a crop 
of sweet corn.   In their own assessment, they feel that the horticultural activity have afforded 
their family a relatively good livelihood.  From the proceeds of the activity, they are able to 
pay their children￿s school fees.  In addition, they have, bought a dairy cow and a pair of 
oxen, and they have a brick-house under construction. 
One major concern, which they explained is shared by many horticultural growers in 
the area, is that they have started observing problems with the soils.  They explained that 





been affected by a wilting disease.  They were concerned that they may already be 
experiencing the problem affecting Kibirigwi Irrigation scheme (see below).  To deal with 
this from, they explained that they have shifted from French bean and tomatoes to sweet 
corn. Another problem experienced in the area is poor water￿use management.  During dry 
spells, farmers down steam do not get sufficient water.  To solve this problem the farmers in 
the areas have formed the  Kutus-Kiriti Water Furrow Farmers￿ Group.  However, although 
the group has designed a system of water use shifts, it has not been able to enforce the new 
system.   The group is also encouraging farmers to use pipes to extract water from the main 
furrow instead using lateral furrows.  This effort has been more successful, mainly because 
the pipes help control the soil problem cited above.   
Case 6: A horticultural farmers￿ group. 
The Kathiriti-Kanjau Horticulture Growers is a registered farmers￿ self-help group.  It 
was founded in the year 2001 and has a membership of 27 farmers.   This and other farmer 
groups in the area were formed, in part, by the desire to eliminate brokers and permit direct 
deals with the principal exporters.  An official of the group explained that the growers 
recognized that the major function of brokers is to assemble large lots for exporters.  The 
farmers realized they could achieve such lots by pooling their produce for collective handling 
by prospective exporters.  Such groups are common in the area.  They, on behalf of member-
farmers, approach an exporter to seek contractual market arrangements.  Such market 
arrangements offer a more liable market outlet as well as high prices as compared to the 
broker market.  Through such arrangements, the exporter contracts the group to supply a 
certain quantity of produce per week depending on the market season.  The exporter supplies 
the seed on credit with a promise to buy the entire produce.  He recovers his cost from the 





The exporter also prescribes the recommended chemicals and production methods, as 
well as requiring farmers to uphold certain sanitary condition.  The group recognizes that 
since member produce is pooled and marketed as one lot, there is an incentive for some 
members not to strictly follow the prescribed practices.  Poor quality crops produced by such 
farmers downgrades the produce for the whole group with heavy losses for farmers adhering 
to the prescribed practices.  The group has therefore employed a field supervisor charged 
with the responsibility of supervising and monitoring production practices to ensure that 
farmer-members follow the prescribed methods.  The supervisor was trained by the exported.  
The group only met his transport cost to Nairobi and his/her subsistence.  The exporter offers 
free training.  
With encouragement from the Department of the Social Services, under which the 
group sought legal recognition, the group has implemented a savings and credit schemes. The 
scheme currently provides members with credit to meet harvesting labor costs.   The group is 
also planning to issue dividends from any surplus savings. 
The group cited poor market agreement as the major problem market constraining 
collective marketing.  The agreements achieved are usually asymmetrical with the buyer 
having the upper hand.  In particular, the group explained that exporters do not conduct 
grading on the field.  The current practice is for buyer to collect the whole produce delivered 
and to grade it in the absence of the farmer representative.  The group only receives 
communication on the quantities meeting the respective grades.    There was a general 
concern that exporter may be using the grading to pass all market risks and uncertainties to 






In spite of the variety of crops and experiences, there are some common themes that 
come out of the case studies.  First, success in horticultural production involves a continuous 
series of experiments and adjustments.  Rarely do farmers ￿get it right￿ the first time, and 
often several crops are tried.  Second, the capital cost of irrigation pumps and the institutional 
issues of water management are perceived to be major constraints on horticultural 
production.  Third, farmer groups play an important role in reducing the transaction costs 
between small farmers and exporters.  These groups allow exporters to distribute inputs on 
credit, to assemble the output, and to recover loan repayments with many small farmers.  
Brokers sometimes play this role, but growers feel they are better off working through a 
farmer group.  And fourth, most of the farmers interviewed felt that commercial horticultural 
production had made a significant contribution to the well-being of their families.  In many 
cases, the additional income is used to buy land and/or to pay school fees. 
 
5.  FRUIT AND VEGETABLE MARKETING  
The success of the fruit and vegetable sector is largely based on the efficiency and 
flexibility of the marketing system.  This is partly because a large share of the potential 
demand for fruits and vegetables is in urban areas and in foreign markets, so that the volume 
of horticultural production is highly dependent on markets to link producers and 
consumers
22.  In addition, the perishability of fruits and vegetables makes prices more 
volatile and production more risky, thus increasing the potential gain from the exchange of 
marketing information between producers and traders.  Third, fruit and vegetable production 
requires more labor, more purchased inputs, and more skill than do grains and legumes, 
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implying that the transmission of credit, inputs, and technical assistance is often necessary.  
The second and third factors suggest that vertical coordination between producers and traders 
is important in fruit and vegetable marketing, particularly when the producers are 
smallholders.   
This section describes the fruit and vegetable marketing system in Kenya.  We begin 
with a discussion of some of the marketing institutions and then describe the main 
characteristics of different types of market channels.  Because of the diversity of the sector, 
however, we are only able to provide a brief outline  
MARKET INSTITUTIONS 
Unlike other major agricultural sub-sectors, where both external and domestic trade 
has been under tight government controls, the marketing of horticultural products has 
generally been free of direct government interventions.  With the exception of onions, the 
government has not been directly involved in the pricing or performance of physical 
functions of horticultural marketing.  The role of the government has been minimal and 
mainly confined to regulatory and facilitative functions (Kimweli 1991).  The remarkable 
performance of the industry has been ascribed to this policy, which engendered autonomy in 
production and marketing decisions thus fostering significant local private initiatives and 
dynamism within the industry.   
The Horticultural Crop Development Agency (HCDA) was established in 1967 under 
an Act of Parliament.  It is a government parastatal charged with the responsibility of 
promoting the development of horticultural crops, licensing exporters, and disseminating 
information on horticultural marketing.  Initially, the HCDA was involved in the direct 





government decided to leave horticultural exports to the private sector, and the HCDA 
withdrew from this activity.    
Currently, HCDA is funded by a levy (12 cents per kilogram) on horticultural exports 
and through support from various international organizations (Lambert 2002).  
Unfortunately, the fact that HCDA is funded by a tax on exports creates an incentive for 
exporters to under-state fruit and vegetable exporters, compromising perhaps the main task of 
HCDA which is to gather and disseminate information about the sector.  Djikstra (1997) 
reports that the some farmers and exporters criticize the HCDA for failing to provide useful 
information to farmers in exchange for the tax.  One report suggests that HCDA ￿has played 
little role in the past decade, staying safely on the sidelines￿ (Ebony Consulting International 
2001). 
Other government involvement in the industry includes provision of extension 
services and promotion through research and development.  The importance attached to the 
industry is reflected in the fact that the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 
(MoARD) has a full-fledged Horticultural Division charged providing extension services to 
producers.   Further, Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI), the national agricultural 
research institute, has, as part of its research stations, a National Horticultural Research 
Institute charged with research and development of horticultural crops.   
The Kenya Plant Health Inspectiion Service (KEPHIS) became operational in 1997 
with a staff of 287.  One of KEPHIS￿s tasks is to inspect imported and exported agricultural 
commodities and to issue required phytosanitary certificates for export shipments.  A team of 
22 inspectors cover the fresh produce and flower sectors.  KEPHIS is seeking recognition by 





inspection responsibilities to KEPHIS and facilitate the entry of Kenyan exports into the E.U.  
Its role in the horticultural sector is likely to increase with the rise in sanitary and 
phytosanitary requirements for exporting to the E.U. (see Jaffee 2003 for more detail). 
The Fresh Produce Exporter Association of Kenya (FPEAK) is a non-governmental 
organization formed in 1975, which currently has 80 members.  Its activities include market 
research, representing exporter interests to the government, liason with research and 
regulatory organizations, support for smallholder outgrower schemes, and the drafting and 
implementation of the Code of Practice for horticultural producers.  FPEAK has been 
supported by USAID (though funding has recently expired) and recieves income from a 
small levy (5 cents per kilogram) on exports.  Although FPEAK traditionally represented 
small and medium exporters, larger exporters are beginning to join to deal with regulatory 
issues and new European environmental regulations.   
FPEAK, in collaboration with HCDA and others, have drafted a 70-page Code of 
Practice for horticultural growers and exporters (FPEAK 1999).  The Code is designed 
satisfy European importers that Kenyan horticultural products are produced in an 
environmentally-friendly way with due regard for worker health and safety.  There is no legal 
enforcement mechanism, but with European certification of the Code, it is likely that 
importers will pressure exporters to adhere to the standards.  Some have expressed concern 
about the cost and feasibility of meeting and documenting compliance with the new Code.  
(Harris et al. 2000; Ebony Consulting International 2001).  
MARKET CHANNELS  
Market channels vary widely depending on the commodity, the location of the final 





between market channels to serve rural consumers, urban consumers, and the export market.  
Figure 3 summarizes the main market channels for each type of consumer, but it is important 
to recognize that this diagram necessarily simplifies the situation, since market channels vary 
widely across commodities and regions.  Some of this diversity is described in the following 
sections. 
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Market channels for rural consumers 
Horticultural producers easily access nearby rural consumers through direct 
marketing channels involving sales at the farm-gate or at rural market centers.  The smallest 
rural markets are informal and periodic, with one or two market days per week.  These 
markets are located close enough to production areas so that the produce is transported to 
market by head-load and by bicycle.  At these markets, transactions are often directly 
between farmers and consumers.   
Larger rural markets are registered and supported by the local government (county 
councils).  These are also periodic, though trade may take place on non-market days as well.  
They are more likely to have permanent stalls where traders sell to consumers and other 
traders.  These larger markets draw farmers from greater distances, so the produce may be 
brought to market on the top of mini-buses and by small trucks (Dijkstra 1997 and 1999).     
Because of the range of agro-ecological conditions in Kenya, different regions 
specialize in different types of fruits and vegetables.  Thus, there is some long-distance rural-
rural trade in fruits and vegetables.  These goods often pass through wholesalers in large 
urban markets, giving rise to the phenomenon of urban-rural flows of produce.     
Market channels for urban consumers  
Produce is brought from rural to urban areas through a chain of intermediaries that 
may include assemblers, brokers, wholesalers, and retailers.  Produce is brought to the urban 
markets by independent assemblers or by wholesalers agents who purchase directly from 
farmers or gather produce from rural markets.  Transportation may involve minibuses (for 
small quantities) or trucks (for larger quantities).  Because of the widely ranging agro-
ecological zones and the associated geographical distribution of production, long distance 





markets.  For the same reason and because of the small sizes of farm production, commission 
brokers, acting on behalf of large and long-distant traders, play an important role in searching 
for supplies and organizing procurements into economical loads.  Dijkstra (1999) shows that 
farm-gate sales of potatoes to ￿collecting wholesalers￿ makes sense for the farmer because 
the traders have lower marketing costs due to economies of scale.  Nonetheless, farmers often 
feel exploited by traders and express a strong desire to deal directly with the principal buyers, 
with some forming into commodity-specific community based groups to organize collective 
sales in order to by-pass the agent.  
Horticultural cooperatives have been promoted by the government as a way to avoid 
￿exploitation￿ by traders.  Although cooperatives are active in marketing coffee, cotton, and 
dairy products, horticultural cooperatives are rare in Kenya.  Attempts in the 1980s to 
organize farmers into a Horticultural Cooperative Union were beset with serious 
management difficulties leading to their abandonment.  According Dijkstra (1997), farmers 
do not trust cooperatives because, in the past, farmers were forced to market their output 
through inefficient and sometimes corrupt cooperatives that were created and managed by the 
government.   
Generally, every major urban center in the country has two markets, a wholesale and 
a retail market, at locations designated by the local government.  The markets are 
administered by urban councils of the local governments.  The councils are charged with the 
responsibility of providing the markets with necessary facilities, including concrete floors, 
roofed sheds, display benches, security, running water and toilets as well as to enforcing 
sanitation.  To finance and maintain the facilities, the councils levy a cess from traders using 





points for distribution of horticultural commodities to urban areas.  The state of the markets, 
however, varies greatly with most experiencing a serious problem of congestions.  The 
authorities often have trouble separating the retail and wholesale functions, as retailers often 
￿invade￿ wholesale markets (Dijkstra 1997).   
Over the years, roadside-market assemblies have developed as convenient target sites 
for motorist, who stop for a snack or to buy fruits and vegetables to take home.  Produce 
commonly sold at roadside contact points includes pineapples, ripe bananas, oranges, 
potatoes, green peas, and carrots.  Green maize, boiled or roasted on the cob, is also a 
common snack sold alongside major roads. Roadside-sellers procure suppliers either directly 
at farm gates or from urban agricultural market assemblies. Some producers also retail own 
produce at the roadsides. 
Fruits and vegetable retailers comprise the principal linkage between the urban 
markets and the final urban consumer.  These are typically small-scale traders operating in 
make-shift-sheds in high-density residential areas, on pavements in busy urban streets, or 
hawking produce door-to-door in the residential areas.  Such vending is common with most 
other agricultural commodities as well as other general consumer products.  It a major 
component of a fast growing informal sector .  However, the legal status of the activity is not 
clearly defined.  Major issues of concern are the congestion of urban streets and sidewalks 
and the sanitary conditions under which produce is sold.   
Market channels for processed fruits and vegetables  
Studies of Kenya￿s horticultural processing sub-sector show that the market for the 
processed food products is highly segmented (Maritim 1994).  The main processed 
commodities include canned vegetables and fruits, jams and marmalades, dehydrated 





vegetables and fruit preserves are generally targeted to affluence consumers in Kenya.  
According, they are distributed through supermarkets, specialty shops, hotels, and other 
outlets catering to high-income consumers.   
Juices and dehydrated vegetables, on the other hand, are target for a wider market 
segment with different marketing strategies for the different market sub-segment.  Low-
income groups are reached with smaller packages through shops and kiosks.  Processor are 
also devoting special marketing strategy towards the school children segment with small 
packages and ease in dispensing of the content.  Spices and food seasoning are generally 
targeted for the high-income groups. Frozen products and juices concentrates are mainly 
targeted for the export market.   
Apart from large and medium processing entrepreneurs, observations in major urban 
centers reveal that individual and village-based small-scale processors, principally producing 
fruit juices, have recently emerged with the liberalization of the sub-sector.  However, there 
is little documentation of their operations.  A study by RELMA (2001) concluded that local 
processing of avocado is limited to cottage industries with potential opportunities in a wide 
market segment.   
Export market channels  
Export channels vary widely, but they can be roughly classified according to the 
degree of vertical integration.  At one extreme is the verticallly integrated Del Monte, which 
produces pineapples on its own plantation in Thika, processes the pineapples, arrange 
shipping to Europe or other destinations, and even distributes the goods to supermarkets and 





Dolan and Humphrey (2000) find that, among the four largest fruit and vegetable exporters, 
40 percent of the production was from their own farms (including own and leased land)
23.   
Another channel involves exporters who contract farmers to produce fruits and 
vegetables for export.  Dijkstra (1997) reports that almost all horticultural exporters rely to 
some degree on contract farmers.  The agreements between exporters and farmers are often 
unwritten and are subject to frequent disputes.  If the market price falls, the exporter may fail 
to pick up the produce and try to source elsewhere.  If the market price rises, farmers may 
sell elsewhere and default on the agreement (Jaffee 1995; Kimenye 1995).  When exporters 
contract directly with farmers, they are often large or medium-scale farmers   Among the four 
largest fruit and vegetable exporters, about 40 percent of supplies are obtained from large-
scale commercial farms and only 18 percent from smallholders (Dolan and Humphrey 2000).   
A third channel involves various types of intermediaries between the farmer and the 
exporter.  Small farmers and those that do not live in the main production zones often rely on 
traders or brokers to assemble produce for resale.  Sometimes a large farmer who has a 
contract with an exporter will coordinate the production and marketing of the some of the 
produce by smallholders living nearby.  These are more likely to be spot market transactions.  
A third type of intermediation is community-based organizations.  For example, in the 
production of French beans for export, farmers have created groups to ensure a minimum 
level of production to attact exporters or traders.  Through self-selection and peer-
monitoring, such groups also provide some assurance of quality and commitment.  Exporters 
use spot market purchases to fill in gaps between their regular supply (from own production 
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and contracts) and their commitments to distributors and supermarkets overseas (Jaffee 1995; 
Ebony Consulting International 2001). 
In the early 1990s, there were about 200 licensed fresh produce exporters, but only 50 
were full-time dedicated exporters.  The other 150 were traders who enter the market as 
opportunities arise (Jaffee 1995).  The smallest and most transient of these are called 
￿briefcase exporters.￿  Few of the fruit and vegetable exporters are foreign companies.  One 
third of them are Kenyans of South Asian origin, who make use of kin connections to export 
produce, particularly Asian vegetables, to the United Kingdom (Dijkstra 1997).  Several 
observers have noted that the export sector has become more concentrated over the 1990s.  
This trend is a response to the increasing role of supermarkets as importers and the premium 
they give for reliability of supply, consistency of quality, and documentation of production 
conditions.  Exporters are being required to monitor and document production practices 
affecting food safety (such as chemical use) and, increasingly, worker conditions and 
environmental impact.  Furthermore, the trend toward pre-packaging and labeling exports so 
they are ready for retail distribution increases the economies of scale in exporting (see 
Kamau 2000; Dolan and Humphreys 2000; ECI 2001; and Jaffee 2003).   
The complexity of export marketing is illustrated by Figure 4, which shows the 
different channels used to export French beans as estimated by Ebony Consulting 
International (2001).  According to this report, 8-10 large-scale exporters with foreign 
distribution capacity account for 75-80 percent of the export volume, while small and 
medium-size exporters represent another 10-15 percent (Ebony Consulting International 





Figure 4--Marketing channels of French beans 
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It should be noted that most exporters are involved in more than one type of 
marketing channel simultaneously.  For example, of the eight largest green bean exporters, 
two rely primarily on own-production and contracts with large-scale farmers.  Two others 
rely mainly on contracts with smallholders.  And the other six make use of a variety of 
strategies for obtaining supplies (Ebony Consulting International 2001).   
 
6.  COMPARISON WITH C￿TE D￿IVOIRE 
BACKGROUND 
As of 1999, C￿te d’Ivoire was the main horticultural exporter in West Africa, 
exporting US$ 140 million of fruits and vegetable in 1999.  This placed C￿te d’Ivoire at 
approximately the same level as Kenya and second only to South Africa among sub-Saharan 
African countries (FAOSTAT 2002).  This section examines the development of the 
horticultural sector in C￿te d’Ivoire and the factors that contributed to the growth in this 
sector.  The goal is not to provide a comprehensive analysis of horticultural exports, but 
rather to highlight the variety of experiences in horticultural development across African 
countries, as well as to identify some similarities with the Kenyan case.   
Over the first two decades of independence, C￿te d’Ivoire was considered an African 
success story.  The country had maintained a high rate of economic growth (7.2 percent 
annually in real terms over 1960-1975) based largely on agricultural exports produced by 
small-scale farmers.  The government successfully diversified its exports, with the 
contribution of cocoa and coffee to agricultural export revenue falling from over 90 percent 
in 1961 to 77 percent by 1975.  Paradoxically, government support for the agricultural sector 





forestry, and fisheries) in gross domestic product fell from 43 percent at independence to 28 
percent in 1974 (Tuinder 1978: 322-323; FAOStat 2002). 
As in Kenya and many other developing countries, however, the government 
responded to the commodity price boom of the 1970s by embarking on a public expenditure 
and investment spree that could not easily be scaled back when the boom subsided.  In the 
1980s, adverse trends in world prices and the accumulation of public debt forced the country 
into a series of structural adjustment programs with the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank (Widner 1993; Zartman and Delgado 1984).  More recently, the reputation of 
C￿te d’Ivoire for political stability was undermined by a coup in 1999, allegations of rigged 
elections in 2000, a coup attempt in 2001, and a armed rebelion in 2002 (Government of C￿te 
d’Ivoire 2003).  Here, we focus on the challenges and opportunities related to horticultural 
exports from C￿te d’Ivoire up to the recent political problems.   
EVOLUTION OF THE IVORIAN HORTICULTURAL SECTOR  
Fruit and vegetables exports from the C￿te d’Ivoire were worth almost US$ 127 
million in 2000, somewhat less than Kenyan fruit and vegetable exports.  However, Ivorian 
exports have not grown as quickly, and they contribute less than 7 percent of the value of 
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Real value of export
 
Source: FAOStat for agricultural statistics and U.S. Department of Commerce for U.S. consumer price index. 
  
Unlike Kenya, where horticultural exports are relatively diversified, the horticultural 
exports of C￿te d’Ivoire are based largely on two commodities, pineapples and bananas, each 
of these commodities has a long history in the country (see Figure 6).  Bananas and plantains 
have been grown in West Africa for centuries, and banana production for export in C￿te 
d’Ivoire began in 1933, when European settlers adopted the crop in response to low prices of 











































































Source: FAOStat for agricultural statistics and U.S. Department of Commerce for U.S. consumer price index. 
 
 
Exports were quite modest, however, and Guinea was the dominant supplier of 
bananas to France at the time (Sawadogo 1977: 119).  During the 1950s, production of export 
crops by African smallholders expanded in spite of policies favoring European growers.  In 
coffee and cocoa, African smallholders came to represent the bulk of production.  The 
banana and pineapple sectors, however, evolved toward a dualistic structure with both large-
scale and small-scale production.  Because of the cost of transportation and the perishability 
of the product, banana production for export was (and remains) concentrated along paved 
roads near Abidjan.  By the time of independence, banana exports were about 90 thousand 
tons, representing about 5 percent of the value of agricultural exports. 
Banana exports have benefited from the highly regulated European banana market.  
France, the United Kingdom, and other European countries gave preferential access to 






24.  In the case of bananas, this policy has given favorable treatment to exports from 
C￿te d’Ivoire, Cameroon, other African exporters, and a few Caribbean exporters at the 
expense of lower-cost producers in Latin Amercia.  The restrictions on European imports 
made banana exports quite remunerative, since European prices were significantly higher 
than world market prices, but import quotas limited the volume.  In spite of a peak in 1974, 
banana exports from C￿te d’Ivoire over the period 1961-1989 averaged 120 thousand tons per 
year, no greater than the level in the early 1960s.   
The export of pineapple products also began during the colonial period, when two 
processing plants were established with foreign investment.  At independence, the export of 
pineapple products was less than half the value of banana exports (2 percent of agricultural 
exports).  However, these exports grew steadily through the 1960s and 1970s so that, by the 
early 1970s, the export value of pineapple had surpassed that of bananas.  At this time, most 
of the pineapple exports were in the form of canned pineapples and single-strength pineapple 
juice.  In the 1980s, however, Thailand expanded exports three-fold, increasing its market 
share of the canned pineapple market to over 50 percent and pushing world prices down 
(Loeillet 1997).  Also during the 1980s, economic reforms in C￿te d’Ivoire reduced subsidies 
for many state enterprises and closed others, including CORFRUITEL, the parastatal in 
charge of marketing fruit (Rouge and N￿Goan 1997).  As a result, C￿te d’Ivoire exports of 
canned pineapple and pineapple juice had practically disappeared by the late 1980s.     
Much of the Ivorian pineapple production, however, switched over to fresh pineapple 
export to Europe by sea-freight, using the same refrigerated freighters (￿reefers￿) used to 
                                                 
24   The 1957 Treaty of Rome established preferential access to markets in France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, 
Spain, and the United Kingdom for exporters from ACP countries.  Exports from other countries, most notably 
in Latin American, were subject to a quota and 20 percent duty.  Germany maintained a duty-free import policy.  
The other five member states maintained a 20 percent duty on banana exports from non-ACP countries.  These 





transport bananas.  This move took advantage of the advantage of C￿te d’Ivoire in terms of 
its proximity to Europe, a factor much more important in the fresh pineapple trade than in the 
market for canned pineapple.  This market is not without its problems, however.  In the late 
1980s, C￿te d’Ivoire began to lose market share to Central American and Caribbean fresh 
pineapple exporters.  After supplying close to 90 percent of the European market for fresh 
pineapple in the mid-1980s, their market share fell to two-thirds in 1990 (Rouge and N￿Goan 
1997).   
The 1990s brought several changes favorable to Ivorian fruit and vegetable exports.  
First, in 1990s, the Office Centrale des Producteurs-Exportateurs d￿Anana et de Bananes 
(OCAB) was formed to represent the interests of exporters, set quality standards, and 
facilitate communication.  OCAB has reduced the number of ￿approved￿ exporters of fruit in 
an attempt to maintain quality standards.  It also organizes the charter of refrigerated ships to 
transport bananas and pineapples to Europe.  
Second, in 1993, after much debate, Europe harmonized its banana import policies to 
make way for the single European market.  Although the United States and Latin American 
exporters pushed for a more liberalized system, as existed in Germany, the EU maintained 
the system of preferences for ACP countries, extending it to all members of the European 
Union.  This expanded the size of the market to which C￿te d’Ivoire and other ACP 
producers had preferential access
25.   
                                                 
25   Under the new regime announced in 1993, EU and ACP exporters were entitled to duty-free access to 
European markets up to 858 thousand tons, with each exporter receiving a quota.  Other imports were subject to 
a 2.0 million tons and a duty of 100 ECU/ton tariff that applied to non-ACP exporters only.  Above 2 million 
tons, banana imports were subject to duties of 750 ECU/ton for ACP bananas and 850ECU/ton for other 
bananas.  A fund was established to assist ACP exporters in the transition.   There were two challenges to the 
new rules under the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT).  In both cases, GATT panels ruled 
against the EU, but adoption of the panel decision was blocked by the EU and ACP countries.  To appease Latin 
American nations, the EU negotiated concession to four of the five Latin American complaintants.  This 





Third, the 50 percent devaluation of the CFA franc in January 1994, helped stimulate 
the economy, particularly the export sectors.  
The net effect of these three factors has been to reanimate fruit and vegetable exports 
from C￿te d’Ivoire.  Banana exports grew from 95 thousand tons in 1990 to 215 thousand 
tons in 1999, while fresh pineapple exports expanded from 135 thousand tons to 183 
thousand tons over the same period (FAOStat 2003). C￿te d’Ivoire became the second-largest 
fresh pineapple exporter in the world after Costa Rica (Ti 2000).  In addition, the export of 
mangoes has grown rapidly, increasing seven-fold over the 1990s to reach US$ 5 million.  As 
of 2000, the total value of fruit and vegetable exports was US 127 million, of which 54 
percent was bananas, 37 percent fresh pineapple, and 4 percent was mangoes.   
In the last two years, two international agreements have been signed that will affect 
C￿te d’Ivoire horticultural exports.  Under the ￿Everything but Arms￿ policy, implemented 
by the EU in March 2001, duties and quotas on almost all goods from the poorest 48 
countries (including almost all of sub-Saharan Africa) have been eliminated.  Although the 
policy excludes bananas, it will facilitate exports of other fruits and vegetables from C￿te 
d’Ivoire and other African countries.  Quality and sanitary and phyto-sanitary barriers remain 
a key constraint to horticultural exports.   
Under pressure from the U.S. and Latin America, supported by WTO rulings, Europe 
has reduced the preferential treatment of ACP countries in its banana imports and promises to 
adopt a tariff-only system by 2006.  As a result, C￿te d’Ivoire and other ACP producers will 
come under increasing competitive pressure from Ecuador and other low-cost Latin 
American exporters (Dickson 2002; Lambert 2002).     
                                                                                                                                                       
countries, reduced the non-ACP duty, and allowed these countries to issue export licenses, effectively 
transferring the quota rents to the exporting country governments (see Dickson 2002 and Guyomard, Laroche, 





POVERTY IMPACT OF IVORIAN HORTICULTURAL EXPORTS  
Who benefits from fruit and vegetable exports from C￿te d’Ivoire?  According to 
Lambert (2002), the small-scale rainfed banana farms that used to dominate the sector have 
given way to medium and large-scale irrigated farms of 100 to 1000 hectares, mostly owned 
by Europeans and selling directly to French importers.  In addition, exporters such as 
Chiquita and the Compangie FruitiŁre are vertically integrated with their own plantations.  
One factor behind this consolidation is the competitive pressure from non-ACP countries to 
reduce the cost of production.  Another factor is the increasingly strict marketing 
requirements by European importers regarding the size, quality, and consistency of the fruit 
and the use of pesticides and other chemicals in production.   The implication is that most of 
any positive impact in terms of poverty reduction would be through the employment of 
workers on the plantations.  It is estimated that there are 35 thousand people employed by the 
banana and pineapple plantations. 
In pineapple production, on the other hand, smallholders continue to dominate.  
According to Rouge and N￿Goan (1997), 70 percent of Ivorian pineapple exports are 
produced by smallholders with 0.5 to 10 hectares.  The remaining 30 percent is produced by 
large plantations, including some owned by the vertically integrated banana companies such 
as Compagnie FruitiŁre and Chiquita.   One reason for the greater involvement of 
smallholders in pineapple production compared to banana production is that the initial 
investment cost of establishing a plot is estimated to be 3-4 times as great for bananas (Rouge 
and N￿Goan 1997).  
Mangoes are the third most important horticultural export.  They are produced by 
smallholders in the north of the country, as well as by farmers in Burkina Faso and Mali who 





mangoes are produced by poor households.  Given the cost of getting mangoes to the coast 
and then to Europe, the farm-gate price may be low, so it is not clear whether mango sales 
are an important component of the income of growers.   
FACTORS BEHIND THE IVORIAN SUCCESS 
The success of the Ivorian fruit and vegetable sector is a qualified one.  Fruit and 
vegetable exports from C￿te d’Ivoire have not grown as fast as those of Kenya, and the role 
of smallholders is less important than in Kenya.  On the other hand, C￿te d’Ivoire is one of 
the three largest exporters of fruits and vegetables in sub-Saharan Africa and it maintained 
solid growth in the 1990s.  Although smallholders play a less important role than in Kenya, 
tens of thousands of rural households depend on the sector for their livelihoods, either as 
farmers or agricultural laborers.   
Several factors lie behind the success (albeit qualified) of fruit and vegetable exports 
from C￿te d’Ivoire.  First, C￿te d’Ivoire has long been known for its political stability.  Until 
the last few years, C￿te d’Ivoire had a reputation for being the most politically stable country 
in West Africa.  President Felix Houphouet-Boigny served as president from independence in 
1960 until his death in 1993.  He was successful in promoting economic growth and 
minimizing political turmoil until the 1980s when commodity prices fell.  The advent of 
multiparty democracy in 1990 is said to have created (or perhaps just exposed) ethnic and 
religious divisions.   
Second, President Houphouet-Boigny has, for the most part, supported agriculture-led 
growth.  He came to prominence representing the interests of African cocoa growers during 
the colonial period.  As president, he drew his support from the rural areas and maintained a 





marketing boards and indirectly through over-valued exchange rates, investment in rural 
infrastructure and agricultural research reflected the priority given to agriculture.    
Third, C￿te d’Ivoire has benefited from its proximity to European markets.  C￿te 
d’Ivoire is just 8-10 days by sea freighter from Marseilles.  Although it also benefits from 
frequent air-connections with Paris, this is less important since most of the Ivorian fruit and 
vegetable exports have been by sea-freight. 
Fourth, the government has had relatively limited involvement in production and 
marketing, particularly in the horticultural sector.  Although the Ivorian agricultural policy 
was more interventionist than that of Kenya, President Houphouet-Boigny had a more pro-
market orientation than most of its West African neighbors.  In particular, C￿te d’Ivoire 
maintained close ties to France, while many of its neighbors rejected European involvement 
and experimented with different variants of socialism.    
 
 
7.  CONCLUSIONS 
As described in the introduction, this paper was motivated by three questions 
regarding the development of the Kenyan fruit and vegetable sector, particularly the export 
sector.   
•  Does the horticultural sector of Kenya and C￿te d’Ivoire constitute a valid success 
story in African agriculture?   
•  What factors have contributed to the historical development of the horticultural sector 
in the two countries? 
•  What lessons can be drawn from these examples for policymakers in other African 
countries and for the international development organizations? 





IS HORTICULTURE A SUCCESS STORY? 
Certainly, horticulture in Kenya can be considered a success in terms of export 
growth.  Fruit and vegetable exports have grown from US$ 2-3 million at independence to 
over US$ 150 million in 1999.   The sector has even grown as a percentage of agricultural 
exports, rising from 3 percent of the total at independence to 17 percent today.  Although 
coffee and tea continue to dominate agricultural exports in Kenya, the growth of tourism and 
horticulture have reduce the vulnerability of the Kenyan economy to price swings in those 
two commodity markets.   
It is more useful, though more difficult, to evaluate its success in terms of the impact 
on the lives of Kenyan families, particularly the poor.  The fact that smallholders produce 
some 60 percent of the exported fruits and vegetables provides strong support for the idea 
that horticultural development has been good for the rural poor.  The results of McCulloch 
and Ota (2002) suggest that farmers who participate in horticultural production earn higher 
incomes than their neighbors who do not.  And the case studies presented in this paper, in 
spite of their non-systematic nature, seem to support the idea that when small farmers get 
involved in horticultural production for export, their incomes rise and this translates into 
more tangible improvements in standard of living such as being able to pay for school fees 
and purchase land.   
The data from the 2000 Rural Household Survey suggest that almost all farmers, large 
and small, rich and poor, participate in some form of horticultural production.  Better-off 
farmers seem to grow a wider variety of fruits and vegetables, but the percentage 
contribution of horticulture to income is fairly constant across income and farm-size 
categories.  Somewhat surprisingly, the horticultural production of large farmers is no more 





be more commercially oriented, it would be a mistake to think of poor farmers (and small 
farmers) as subsistence farmers.  Even among the poorest 20 percent of Kenyan farmers, 41 
percent of the fruit and vegetable output is marketed.   
And the gross margin analysis indicates that, under certain conditions, horticultural 
production can produce substantially higher returns per hectare than staple food crop 
production.  For example, one crop of French beans can generate gross margins more than 
ten times greater than maize-bean intercropping.   
What is the direct impact of horticultural exports on Kenyan smallholders?  If 
smallholders account for about 47 percent of fresh produce exports and the farm-gate price is 
60 percent of the F.O.B. price, then the direct benefits of fruit and vegetable exports to 
smallholders is about US$ 46 million.  Estimates of the number of smallholders that 
participate in horticultural exports vary widely.  Jaffee (1995) estimates that 13-16 thousand 
smallholders are involved in fresh produce export, while Swanberg (1995) cites a figure of 
500 thousand.  In their diagram of the French bean market channels, ECI (2001) shows 20-50 
thousand small growers participating in French bean exports alone.  If we assume the 
smallholder French bean exporters in the survey by Kamau (2000) are typical of smallholder 
exporters, this would imply about 108,000 smallholders in the export sector
26.   This figure 
must be considered highly speculative since we do not know if the sample was representative 
of smallholders producing export French beans, much less smallholders producing fresh 
produce for export.     
                                                 
26   This calculation is based on US$ 46 million in total horticultural export revenue for smallholders, an average 
horticultural sales of about 32 thousand Ksh, and the June 1999 exchange rate of 70 Ksh/US$.  Among those 
selling French beans in the 2000 Rural Household Survey, the average value of sales was just Ksh 14,000 or 
US$ 175, but these farms include those supplying the domestic market.  The average value of horticultural sales 
in the survey carried out by McCulloch and Ota (2003) was 170 thousand shillings or over US$ 2000, but the 





Although less visible, it is likely that the indirect benefits associated with horticultural 
exports are greater than the direct benefits.  First, the multiplier effect of injecting US$ 46 
million annually into the rural sector generates benefits for other households and sectors who 
produce goods purchased by export producers.  Second, this analysis has focused on 
smallholders producing for export, but it is important to recognize the employment effects of 
horticultural exports extend beyond this.  Del Monte alone employs several thousand workers 
in its processing plants and estates.  Third, the skills and institutional development stimulated 
by the horticultural export sector also serve to development the domestic horticultural 
market.  Given the fact that 96 percent of fruit and vegetable production is consumed 
domestically, even small improvements in yield, post-harvest methods, and marketing 
efficiency in the domestic supply chain could have benefits to the economy that are large 
relative to the direct benefits of horticultural exports. 
It is less clear whether to consider the Ivorian horticultural sector a success story.  
First, the sector has not grown in a consistent manner.  In real terms, the value of fruit and 
vegetable exports in 1999 was still somewhat below the levels it reached in the mid-1970s 
and the mid-1980s.  Second, the role of smallholders in the Ivorian fruit and vegetable sector 
is more limited.  Bananas, the largest horticultural export, are produced mainly on large-scale 
farms and by vertically integrated multi-national companies.  Certainly, there are thousands 
of farm workers whose livelihoods are supported by the banana sector, but it is likely that the 
benefits are less widely distributed among Ivorian households than it would be if banana 
production were based on smallholder production.  Third, it is not clear to what degree the 
success of the Ivorian banana sector is based on European trade policies that discriminate 





can be maintained when Europe removes these preferential policies, a change which is not 
imminent but may be inevitable under World Trade Organization commitments. 
Nonetheless, there are some positive signs in the Ivorian horticultural sector.  First, 
the sector was able to adjust to the loss of the canned pineapple exports by developing fresh 
pineapple exports to Europe (Kenya attempted to launch fresh pineapple exports to Europe, 
but it proved uneconomical).  In addition, Ivorian horticultural exports showed healthy 
growth (4.4 percent) over the 1990s, including expansion of smallholder crops such as 
pineapple, mango, and papaya for export.  Although it is difficult to foresee the impact of the 
current political crisis in C￿te d’Ivoire, it seems inevitable that the institutional and 
commercial development necessary to expand horticultural exports will be set back more 
than a few years.   
WHAT FACTORS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE SUCCESS? 
Several factors have contributed to the success of the horticultural sector in Kenya 
and, in a more limited way, C￿te d’Ivoire.   
Geography and climate   Kenya is favored with an equatorial latitude and bimodal 
rainfall that reduce seasonality, combined with a range of altitudes, allowing the production 
of tropical fruits such as mangoes, pineapple, and avocados, as well as temperate vegetables 
such as French beans.  Furthermore, Nairobi and its airport are located in the western 
highlands, an area endowed with good soils and a suitable climate for vegetable production.   
Similarly, the areas of C￿te d’Ivoire most appropriate for banana production are along 
the cost, near the port of Abidjan.  In addition, among countries with a humid-tropical 





 Transportation infrastructure. The cost and duration of transportation to major 
markets in Europe is a critical factor in the success of the horticultural sector.  Both Kenya 
and C￿te d’Ivoire serve as regional hubs for air traffic.  The growth of the Kenyan tourism 
industry and the consequent frequency of air connections with Europe has facilitated the 
development of fresh produce exports to Europe via air-freight.  In C￿te d’Ivoire, much of the 
horticultural export is by sea-freight, so investment and efficient management of the port in 
Abidjan is of critical importance.  Domestic transportation infrastructure is also an important 
factor, since horticultural exports do not tolerate delays in getting to the airport.  The Kenyan 
horticultural sector benefits from an extensive road network in the highland areas.  It is 
estimated that much of the export vegetable production in Kenya takes place within 100 
kilometers of the airport.  Similarly, banana production in C￿te d’Ivoire is concentrated along 
paved roads near the port.   
Limited direct government intervention in horticultural markets.  Another factor is 
that the Kenyan government has not intervened to any significant degree in horticultural 
markets to buy, sell, export, or set prices.  In Kenya, the Horticultural Crop Development 
Authority was originally given authority to fix prices, regulate trade, operate processing 
facilities, and market horticultural goods.  Based on its unsuccessful experience, the 
functions were pared back to regulation, market information, and advisory services
27.  State 
enterprises were actively involved in various horticultural processing operations, often as part 
of joint ventures with foreign companies.  Most of the growth in horticultural exports, 
however, has been in fresh produce.  In any case, the horticultural sector was never as tightly 
                                                 
27 The HCDA maintained a monopoly on onion marketing and export briefly and later competed with private 
onion traders.  In 1986, the government required HCDA to withdraw from direct marketing.  It is probably not a 






controlled as the maize, coffee, and tea sectors were.  In spite of the proliferation of state 
enterprises, the investment climate in Kenya was good, at least compared to many other 
African countries.  This climate allowed investment in the horticultural sector by local and 
international firms, most notably by Del Monte in the 1960s.   
Similarly, C￿te d’Ivoire is said to have followed an agriculture-led development 
strategy and kept direct intervention in agricultural markets to a modest level.  Probably the 
area of greatest direct involvement in the horticultural sector was in the pineapple processing, 
where joint ventures between private investors and various public institutions were the rule.  
When the export of processed pineapple products collapsed in the late 1980s, even this form 
of participation in horticulture disappeared.  It is probably important not to exaggerate the 
importance of the lack of direct government intervention in horticulture.  Even during the 
height of state intervention in agricultural markets in the late 1970s and early 1980s, few 
African governments ventured into the risky area of fresh produce marketing.   
Policies allowing private and international investment.   Both Kenya and C￿te 
d’Ivoire have had relatively liberal policies regarding foreign investment and investment by 
local businesses.  In both countries, foreign investment has contributed to increasing the 
capacity of horticultural production, processing, and export.  In Kenya, Del Monte is the 
largest example, but Dijkstra (1997) lists 20 other private processors of fruits and vegetables 
in the country as of 1990.  Lambert (2002) also stresses the importance of Kenya￿s ￿open 
skies￿ policy, under which exporters and shipping companies may charter planes in their own 
name.  In C￿te d’Ivoire, Chiquita and Compagnie FruitiŁre have played a central role in 





Macroeconomic stability and realistic exchange rates.  Both Kenya and C￿te d’Ivoire 
had reputations for political and macroeconomic stability in the 1960s and 1970s, which is 
necessary to elicit long-term investments in productive capacity.  Similarly, a realistic 
exchange rate, which gives exporters the full value of the foreign exchange they generate, is 
critical factor in stimulating exports, including horticultural exports.  Although both countries 
experienced economic problems in the 1980s, the level of inflation and the extent of 
exchange rate over-valuation was modest compared to that experienced by some of their 
neighbors, including Tanzania, Uganda, and Ghana.  The 1994 devaluation of the CFA franc 
provided important stimulus to horticultural exports (among others) in C￿te d’Ivoire, 
contributing to the healthy 4.4 percent growth rate in fruit and vegetable exports over 1990-
99.   
Institutional innovation.  Horticultural development requres a continuous process of 
institutional innovation at two levels.  First, institutions are needed to address sector-wide 
externalities and coordination problems.  For example, the adoption of a common code of 
practice, the exchange of market information, and funding of research and extension are 
activities that benefit the sector as a whole but cannot easily be carried out by an individual 
firm.  Second, marketing institutions are needed to improve vertical coordination between 
farmers and trader/processors.  This may include various types of contract farming, farmer 
credit groups, marketing cooperatives, or farmer associations.   
The Kenyan government has allowed and (in some cases) promoted the development 
of a wide range of private marketing institutions such as the Fresh Produce Exporters 
Association of Kenya (FPEAK), local producer associations, self-help groups, and so on.  In 





between farmers and buyers.  In spite of early attempts to oblige processors to work with 
smallholders, greater leeway is now given for the most economical arrangement to evolve in 
response to market signals.  Over the decades, Kenyan participants in the horticultural sector 
have accumulated considerable experience in managing the relationship between growers and 
buyers.  Today, contract farming may be more widely used in Kenya than anywhere else in 
Africa, though conflicts between farmers and buyers are an almost universal feature of these 
schemes.  One source of conflict is the fact that after a buyer provides the assistance needed 
by smallholders (in the form of seed, inputs, and credit) he faces the risk that other buyers 
will come and ￿poach￿ the harvest and the loan will not be repaid.  Alternatively, if the 
market price falls, the buyer may refuse to honor its commitment or use grading as a pretext 
for refusing shipment.  Arbitrary and non-transparent.grading procedures is a common 
complaint among contract growers.     
In C￿te d’Ivoire, the government has created a series of institutions to coordinate 
horticultural exports with varying success.  In the 1960s, small-scale horticultural producers 
formed an export cooperative.  In 1976, this was replaced by SICROFEL, a marketing board 
with a monopoly on horticultural exports.  This approach failed due to high costs, 
bureaucratic procedures, and corruption.  It was replaced in 1978 by COFRUITEL, a 
producer organization with greater participation by exporters but without a legal export 
monopoly (Hormann and Weitor 1980).  More recently, the government created the 
Organisation Centrale de l￿Ananas et de la Banane to coordinate the sector and provide 
information and other public goods.  One of the biggest coordination tasks that the Ivorian 





the arrival of ships to transport them.  Another is developing a strategy to address mounting 
concerns among importers regarding food safety, the environment, and working conditions. 
Domestic demand.   In Kenya, tourism expanded the domestic demand for high-
quality fruits and vegetables.  As hotels and restaurants established supply chains to supply 
this produce, they gave Kenyan farmers more experience with horticultural production and 
indirectly strengthened the infrastructure and logistical skills of traders, all of which 
facilitated the development of the horticultural export sector.  Similarly, the domestic 
demand for Asian vegetable gave Kenyans experience in growing and marketing Asian 
vegetables.  These factors facilitated the development of market channels to supply fruits and 
vegetables to Asian and European consumers overseas.  Although less well documented, the 
large French population in C￿te d’Ivoire before and after independence may have facilitated 
the development of the export fruit sector there.  
International commercial links.   The presence of the Asian community in Kenya has 
undoubtedly contributed to horticultural crop development.  Before the 1970s, the Asian 
community created a demand for Asian vegetables, providing smallholders with valuable 
experience in these crops which would later be useful in serving the UK market.  In addition, 
the presence of the Asian community made it easier to penetrate the UK market, first with 
Asian vegetables and later with French beans and other fresh produce.  In the case of C￿te 
d’Ivoire, multinational corporations (Chiquita and Compagnie FruitiŁre) offer a different 
solution to the problem of coordinating African supply and European demand.  By vertically 
integrating production, processing, and distribution, the flow of information and credit is 





WHAT ARE THE LESSONS FOR OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES?  
Clearly, some of the factors mentioned in the previous section are out of the control 
of public policy and investment.  Little can be done to alter the geographic and climatic 
features of a country.  Nor is it practical to alter the ethnic composition of a country to allow 
greater links with similar groups in Europe.  On the other hand, most of the other factors 
carry lessons that are applicable for other countries.   
Geography and climate.  Although government policy has no control over these 
factors, similar conditions exist in Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and parts of Tanzania.  C￿te 
d’Ivoire does not have the same range of altitude, but rainfall varies widely between the semi-
arid north and wetter south.  In this respect, it is similar to other coastal West African nations, 
most notably Ghana and Cameroon. 
Stability.   Political and economic stability matter.  Stability provides investors with 
the confidence that they will be able to reap the benefits of long-term investments.  Although 
both Kenya and C￿te d’Ivoire have had leaders whose tenure spanned decades, political 
stability should not be defined in terms of the duration of a given regime, but rather in terms 
of the durability of policies and economic institutions over time.   
Non-intervention.  The tendency of the Kenyan and Ivorian governments not to 
intervene directly in horticultural production and marketing is clearly an approach that can be 
(and is) emulated by other countries.  The fresh fruit and vegetable sector is simply too 
diverse, too risky, and too fast-changing for state enterprises or marketing boards to play a 
constructive role.  Kenya￿s earlier experience in promoting joint ventures between foreign 
companies and state enterprises is almost uniformly unsuccessful and serves as a counter-
example.  The most successful processed horticulture operation in Kenya has been Del 





Investment in agricultural research and extension.  Both Kenya and C￿te d’Ivoire 
have invested in horticultural research, developing institutions that have their roots in the 
colonial period.  Although the contribution of horticultural research to the Kenyan and 
Ivorian horticultural sectors is not well documented, studies of the benefits of agricultural 
research almost invariably show high rates of return.  The fact that horticulture often involves 
new crops or new varieties to satisfy a export market only increases the need for research and 
extension efforts.  Disease control and post-harvest processing are also particularly important 
in the case of horticultural research.  And new sanitary and phyto-sanitary requirements by 
importing countries create a demand for research into ways to reduce or eliminate pesticide 
residues and prevent the spread of horticultural pests. 
Market exchange rate.   Exchange rate policy is particularly important for 
horticultural exports.    A market exchange rate provides greater incentives to produce 
exports (including horticultural exports).  Furthermore, a liberalized market for foreign 
currency facilitates the purchase of imported equipment and inputs for production.  This is 
more important for horticulture than for field crops because of the need for imported seed, 
agricultural chemicals, and specialized equipment.  The positive response of Ivorian fruit 
exports to the 1994 devaluation of the CFA franc demonstrates this point.    
Promoting institutional innovation.  The Kenyan experience demonstrates the 
importance of allowing a variety of private institutions and marketing arrangements to 
develop.  The early experience of Del Monte in Kenya shows that it takes more than 
experience and technical skills to survive in horticulture.  It is necessary to continually 
experiment, innovate, and adapt to changing environments.  The horticultural sector in Kenya 





in spot markets, personalized relationships with traders, implicit contract, explicit contracts, 
farmer organizations, medium- and large-scale farming, and vertically integrated producer-
exporters.  Many commodity channels involve various scales of production and several types 
of farmer-buyer linkages.  The government can play a role in facilitating institutional 
innovation through the provision of market information, extension services, mediation of 
disputes, and the establishment of standards.   
Linking smallholders to high-value urban and export markets.   Linking small 
farmers to high-value urban and export markets is an important strategy for raising rural 
incomes and reducing poverty.  Such a strategy may also be critical for maintaining export 
competitiveness, at least for some labor-intensive crops that require careful husbandry.  How 
can the government promote smallholder involvement?  First, it should avoid leasing land at 
concessionary rates, subsidizing credit for mechanization, and providing tax incentives for 
agricultural investment, all of which subsidize the formation of large-scale capital-intensive 
farms.  In some sectors, these farms will be more competitive anyway, but there is no 
rationale for favoring these farms through public policy.  Second, the government should 
avoid counter-productive attempts to impose cooperative production, contract farming, 
nucleus estate production, or any other specific marketing system.  Efficient market 
institutions should evolve out of experiments with different forms.  Third, contract farming 
shows some promise for delivering improved technology, credit, and information to farmers, 
but such schemes only make sense with a crop that involves new technology, an uncertain 
market, a large initial investment, and/or specialized husbandry.  Even in these cases, 
contract farming schemes often collapse when other buyers come to ￿poach￿ at harvest, 





between farmers and exporters or other buyers by helping to organize farmer groups, 
establishing ground-rules for farmer-buyer contracts, dissemination of lessons learned from 
successful contract schemes, establishing small-claims courts to address contract disputes, 
gathering and disseminating information about the past performance of buyers and farmers, 
and providing certification services to reduce the transactions costs faced by buyers trying to 
purchase from many small farmers.   
Air transport sector.  The importance of air-freight costs in the competitiveness of 
export horticulture indicates has implications for policy.  The aviation industry is heavily 
protected in most parts of the world, with regulations controlling access by foreign carriers.  
Africa is no exception with its plethora of small and uneconomic national airlines.  Adopting 
an open skies policy might endanger some of these national airlines, but it would probably 
introduce greater competition and reduce the cost of air freight.  This would have a positive 
impact on the export of fresh produce and other high-value commodities.   
Ethnic minorities.  The positive contribution of the Asian traders to Kenya￿s 
horticultural development has lessons for other developing countries.  Ethnic minority 
trading communities are a common feature across the world, from the Chinese in Malaysia to 
the Lebanese in West Africa.  Given the suspicion and resentment that inevitably occurs on 
the part of the majority, special efforts are needed by the government to provide equal 
treatment under the law.    
Investment in irrigation.  Although public and private investment in irrigation has 
facilitated the growth of the horticultural sector, the implications must be drawn carefully.  
Large-scale public irrigation projects in Kenya and elsewhere in Africa have often proven to 





lack of adequate feasibility analysis, and problems in managing and maintaining the system 
after completion.   In the past ten years, most of the investment and increases in capacity in 
Kenyan irrigation have been carried in the private sector, by large-scale commercial farms 
and by groups of smallholders.  The case studies discussed earlier provided several examples 
of farms that started horticultural production when they obtained a pump.  This finding 
highlights the need for a competitive market for agricultural equipment, including water 
pumps.  Given the externality issues associated with irrigation, the government has a role to 
play in facilitating the formation of water-user groups to regulate water use, organize 
maintenance, and resolve disputes.  In addition, the government can fund research and 
dissemination activities to stimulate innovation, particularly in micro-irrigation technology. 
  Contract enforcement.  Although disputes in contract farming arrangements will 
never be avoided completely, the experience of Kenya (and other countries) indicates that 
there may be a role for the government in enforcing contracts between buyers and growers, 
or at least in mediating the disputes between them.  Developing new institutional 
arrangement that would facilitate the enforcement of contracts would contribute significantly 
to the more-widespread use of contract farming and would expand the participation of small 
farmers in high-value horticultural production and export.  Although the costs of enforcing 
each contract may be prohibitively high, there may be scope for better record-keeping to 
identify and exclude farmers that have violated contracts in the past.  In the short run, this 
would protect the interests of buyers, but in the long run it would increase the availability of 
credit and other forms of assistance for farmers.   
Clearly, the development of export horticulture depends in part on geography, 





not have the potential for large-scale horticultural development even with the best policies 
and investment.  Many of the factors that have contributed to the success of the horticultural 
sectors in Kenya and C￿te d’Ivoire are, however, subject to influence through policy, 
regulation, and public investment.  Furthermore, most of the lessons derived from the 
Kenyan and Ivorian examples make sense for the development of commercial agriculture, 
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